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ABSTRACT
CONFLICT AND THREAT BETWEEN PRE-EXISTING GROUPS: AN 
APPLICATION OF IDENTITY TO BIAS, PERSUASION AND BELIEF
PERSEVERANCE
by
Brian R. Laythe 
University of New Hampshire, December, 2006 
The current research examines the role of identity in the context of threat towards 
further understanding bias, persuasion, and belief perseverance in what is defined as IRT 
(Immediately Relevant Threat) conditions. Using pre, middle, and post measurements, 
four groups of differing ideological student organizations across 4 university or college 
campuses were presented critical messages that were varied by the source being either an 
in-group or out-group presenter of the message. Messages were also varied by either 
presenting a message that criticized the entire group or only a few of its members. With 
the use of hierarchical linear modeling and conventional ordinary least square statistics, 
results indicated general and specific effects of source of the message and the 
inclusiveness of criticism towards predicting bias, persuasion, and belief perseverance in 
environmental settings. Findings and their practical applications are discussed.
viii
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
Imagine a coffee shop scenario where you witness two different social clubs 
meeting over a recent issue that has occurred between them. Although polite at first, as 
time passes you can see that things are not going well. Voices raise in harsh criticism of 
past behavior, fists pound into the table, personal attacks are made, and suddenly the two 
groups rise from the table and quickly go their separate ways. When you go over to ask 
one of the conversants what went wrong, his simple reply is, “We didn’t see things the 
same way; we were right, and they were wrong.” This scenario explained from social 
identity (Tajfel & Tinner, 1979) or self- categorization theory (Turner, Hogg, Oakes, 
Reicher, & Wetherell, 1987) would suggest that hostility between groups is a result of the 
personal relevance of the situation to each group’s sense of identity. More specifically, 
each group’s sense of social identity (i.e., the sense-of-self derived from group 
membership) was threatened. In order to maintain a positive group image and group 
identity, each group engaged in derogation of each other (Haslam & Wilson, 2000; 
Haslam, Oakes, Reynolds, & Turner, 1999; Tajfel & Turner, 1979; Turner et al., 1987). 
The above scenario is a description of a realistic conflict situation, as opposed to early 
conclusions derived from social identity, which represent findings from a laboratory 
employing a variant of the minimal group paradigm (MGP; Brewer, 1979; Tajfel, Billig, 
Bundy, & Flament, 1971). MGP was a laboratory design that created artificial in-groups
1
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(i.e., the group to which a participant belongs) and out-groups (i.e., the group to which 
the participant does not belong) while controlling for environmental factors that usually 
provide cues to an individual’s group membership. Because environmental group cues 
were not present, the random assignment to a particular group represented the only cue 
from which participants derived group identity (Bourhis, Sachdev, & Gagnon, 1994; 
Tajfel et al., 1971). The results of these studies demonstrated significant in-group bias in 
minimal conditions, supporting a theory that in-group bias requires little environmental 
context (Brewer, 1979; Tajfel et al., 1971).
Subsequent examinations of social identity from a self-categorization perspective 
(Turner et al., 1987) have examined group membership with less stringent conditions 
than MGP, generally allowing the social cues for which MGP controls. More 
specifically, researchers allow for group categorizations such as nationality, gender, or 
school membership (Haslam, Oakes, Turner, & McGarty, 1995; Oakes, Turner, & 
Haslam, 1991) to examine in-group bias. Likewise, other researchers have examined 
groups with specific ideologies and agendas (Crisp, Hewstone & Cairns, 2001; Islam & 
Hewstone, 1993), but these examinations represent broad religious groups, such as Islam, 
or broad conceptions of the Hindu faith. None of these identity studies or previous MGP 
studies necessarily represent the natural association between an individual and a 
personally chosen membership group, such as a club or professional organization. 
Previous researchers have not examined the influence of social identity within a realistic 
and immediately relevant threat condition (e.g. Immediate and Relevant Threat, IRT). In 
other words, bias and evaluations of threat messages have not been examined when (a) 
in-group beliefs are based on personally and previously chosen participant membership,
2
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(b) the nature of a presented message directly criticizes the personal behavior of a target 
group, increasing relevance, and (c) the evaluation and consequence of a presented 
message are immediate.
Personally chosen groups differ radically from laboratory MGP groups in that 
the latter often uses a token or monetary exchange to determine favoritism (Brewer, 
1979). Similarly, personally chosen groups are more specific than the broad 
categorizations such as gender or nationality that represent large inclusive group 
membership. Personally chosen groups often contain a specific set of ideals, norms, and 
morays that promote a specific view of the world, a specific agenda, and specific 
expectations of behaviors. In addition, most voluntary groups contain members who 
have invested time and effort in their activities, and in turn are more committed to these 
groups (Branscome, Ellemers, Spears, & Doosje, 1999). It is the voluntary investment in 
a particular group with specific norms and beliefs that likely represent a more realistic 
situation occurring in our social environment.
Similarly, messages that directly criticize the behavior of target groups are in 
stark contrast to previous research. For instance, previous research has examined in­
group and out-group stances on messages of tangential importance (e.g., the right to die 
for terminally ill patients, Mackie, Gastardo-Conaco, & Skelly, 1992; or road-safety 
McGarty, Haslam, Hutchinson, & Turner, 1994), but do not explicitly examine direct 
threat towards the good standing or good behavior of a group. This negative threat 
message is much more direct and personally relevant to a participant within a group 
because the message impinges upon the reputation and standing of the group in question. 
As such, the personal applicability of a threat message as described above, aside from
3
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being woefully more typical in genuine group conflicts, provides immediate relevance 
towards evaluating and determining the potential consequences of a message.
Finally, a message criticizing group behavior presented by another group of 
similar standing provides immediate conflict and potential threat that, in theory, has 
short-term consequences. For example, Van Knippenberg, Lossie, and Wilke, (1994) 
studied advocacy versus non-advocacy of exams for college graduating seniors. The 
consequences of advocating or not advocating for these exams would not affect the 
participants for several months to several years. In contrast, by providing an immediate 
and relevant threat, individuals within organizations are forced to immediately 
contemplate the validity of the threat and understand that responses will have subsequent 
short term consequences.
In essence, these conditions of an IRT scenario have not been thoroughly 
examined by researchers interested in social identity and bias. The aim of the current 
research is to examine realistic personal group interaction when the nature of the 
interaction involves threat (i.e., negative appraisals of an in-group from another group). 
We hope to explore two general avenues of research that are related to an IRT condition. 
First, we wish to generally examine the effect of differing group ideologies towards the 
inhibition or promotion of bias. Specifically, we are interested in whether or not 
particular ideologies (e.g., norms, beliefs, and accepted behaviors towards others) 
promote differing degrees of bias and the ways in which threat messages are processed. 
Second, we examine the role of in-group and out-group differentiation created within 
relevant and personal threat, as well as the bias that is likely to result from predictions 
postulated by self-categorization theory (Turner et al., 1987; Turner, 1975). We will also
4
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examine the relation of identity in regards to persuasion (McGarty, et al., 1994) within 
IRT conditions, not only in the ability of negative messaging to change in-group 
attitudes, but also in terms of how in-groups process negative messages. We will 
examine the persistence of in-groups’ beliefs about their own group when presented with 
a counter-attitudinal personally relevant message. Additionally, we examine the bias that 
may persist as a result of the initial assessments an in-group makes towards an out-group.
Theoretical Background: Personal and Social Identity 
Social Identity Theory
Two of the most prominently studied areas of human behavior involves the 
influence of the group upon the individual and how groups interact with each other.
Early studies on group conflict between boys at summer camp (Sherif, 1956), in-groups 
and out-groups as the cause of prejudice (Allport, 1954), and group conformity effects 
(Asch, 1955) demonstrate the power of a group towards both conformity and prejudice. 
Henri Tajfel built upon these classic studies and subsequently presented a body of 
research to which later developed as social identity theory (Tajfel & Turner, 1979; See 
Hogg & Abrams, 1999, for a historical review). Social identity theory (SIT) is a series of 
premises maintaining that our sense of self and behavior is partially derived from the 
collective self (Hogg & Williams, 2000). More specifically, our affiliation with social 
groups partially dictates our sense of self and our behavior towards other groups. These 
social affiliations correspond to our social identity, the parts of the self dependent upon 
social group context and affiliation. Conversely, SIT also proposes the construct of 
personal identity, a sense of self derived from personal qualities and interpersonal 
relationships (Hogg & Abrams, 1999).
5
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According to SIT, the motivational component of in-group/out-group 
classification is to maintain positive social identity that in turn promotes positive self- 
image (Tajfel, 1981). It is assumed that social categories (e.g., nationality or ethnicity, 
club membership, political or religious affiliations) provide a partial definition of whom 
one is by providing behavioral, attitudinal, and evaluational norms (Haslam et al., 1999). 
Because group memberships help to foster a positive self image, the evaluations of other 
groups are often less favorable than evaluations of the group to which an individual 
belongs (Brewer, 1979; Hogg et al., 1995; Tajfel et al., 1971; Tajfel & Turner, 1979). In 
sum, SIT postulates that in-group bias occurs because people wish to maintain a positive 
sense of self.
Self-Categorization Theory
Self-categorization theory (SCT; Turner et al., 1987) is a further development of 
SIT that expands on the cognitive process of self-categorization. SCT places emphasis 
upon the process whereby judgments are made of the similarity of the group to which an 
individual belongs in comparison to the differences of characteristics of another group 
(Hogg et al., 1995; Turner, 1975). This comparison process provides an explanation of 
when personal or group identity is relevant in social situations. According to Turner et 
al. (1987), the process of comparison of the similarities and differences between groups 
results in depersonalization, or the tendency to abandon a personal sense of self in order 
to view the self as prototypically similar to other members of the group. This 
depersonalization accentuates salient group identity (Hogg, Turner, & Davidson, 1990; 
Turner et al., 1987; Turner, 1975; Turner, 1999). Thus, situations that are relevant to 
group comparison result in individuals engaging their group identity, whereas situations
6
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that do not provoke group comparison do not result in individuals engaging in group 
identity. The above statement reflects the salience of the situation, or relevance of any 
given situation for group identity. As situations vary within the social world, salience of 
a group identity must also be examined in the environment. That is, in some situations, a 
particular group membership may be an important factor in defining the self, but in other 
cases it may not be as relevant (see Lorenzi-Cioldi, 1991, and Hogg & Turner, 1987, for 
examples). Thus, SCT proposes that in-group/out-group formation is not static, but 
unfolds in a situation-to-situation basis (Hogg et al., 1995; Turner, 1999).
Because salience is a crucial mechanism of SCT, the cognitive processes that 
induce salience are important to understanding the theory. SCT explains the function of 
salience within the context of normative and comparative fit (Haslam & Turner, 1992; 
Hogg & Turner, 1987; Oakes & Turner, 1986). With comparative fit, salience varies as a 
function of the comparison and relevance of the situation in terms of an appropriate 
comparison group (or groups). That is, group comparison is examined in the context of 
having other relevant groups against which to compare (Haslam & Turner, 1992). 
Essentially, in-group and out-group formation will occur when the differences between 
the in-group and the targeted out-group are greater than the differences between other 
additional out-groups (Haslam & Turner, 1992). For example, changing the number and 
kind of countries to which Australian participants compared America resulted in different 
degrees of stereotypic traits. Specifically, Australians were biased towards Americans 
when Americans were the only other group against which to compare. In contrast, when 
other countries with very dissimilar characteristics from Australians were also present to
7
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compare, Americans were not seen as negatively (Haslam, Turner, Oakes, McGarty, & 
Hayes, 1992; see also Haslam et al., 1995 for a similar experiment).
In contrast to comparative fit, normative fit represents the similarity or difference 
between a group’s category specific beliefs and assumptions, in addition to the actual 
data presented. In other words, do the beliefs held about a specific group match the 
observed behavior of the other group? For example, researchers examining normative fit 
have shown that contrary behavior from the expected group norm produces differences in 
participants’ attributions of that behavior. Behaviors are attributed as situational when 
expected out-group behavior contradicts previous expectations, whereas behaviors are 
attributed as personal when out-group behavior supports previous expectations (Oakes et 
al., 1991). More importantly, behaviors that are contrary to in-group beliefs inhibit their 
perception of a conglomerate of individuals as a group. In the same study by Oakes et al. 
(1991), an observer’s perception of group differentiation by sex role was highest when 
groups of men were disagreeing with groups of women on a particular issue. In contrast, 
perceived group differentiation was significantly less when members within the group 
disagreed with each other.
In summation, SIT and SCT postulate a global theory for explaining group 
differentiation. SIT mandates that group identity is important because it provides a sense 
of worth to individuals. Because that sense of worth is important to an individual’s self­
esteem, preferential treatment is given to groups to which we belong, whereas out-groups 
may receive derogation in order to protect the group that provides us with worth. SCT 
elaborates on the conditions of group differentiation. Using comparative and normative 
fit, group identity is relevant only when there is meaningful contrast (i.e., salience)
8
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between a group identity and an appropriate group(s) against which to compare. When 
group membership is not relevant in an environmental situation, depersonalization and 
group differentiation does not occur. Conversely, when a situation involves the status of 
a group in context to other groups, these factors do occur and bias can result.
Social Identity. Threat, and Salience Within an Ecologically Valid Setting 
The current study examines the role of identity and the consequences of threat 
within a realistic setting. Additionally, I examine several components and consequences 
of threat in order to provide comprehensive findings with realistic social conflict. The 
first section examines a general question that overlies our specific examination of bias, 
persuasion, and belief persistence with regards to threat messages. Specifically, in what 
way, if any, do pre-existing groups with personally chosen membership and pre-existing 
ideologies and norms inhibit or promote bias in the context of SIT and SCT theories?
The essential goal of this question is to determine if groups of individuals who exhibit 
specific beliefs, norms, attitudes, and biases will generally confound the principals of 
salient contrast and subsequent ratings on bias and persuasion variables or if social 
identity is a general mechanism to which all groups, regardless of specific ideologies, are 
subject.
Subsequent sections in the manuscript address the specific expected outcomes of 
differing degrees of salient contrast towards specific bias and persuasion variables in the 
context o f threat. First, in-group bias will be examined as a result of threat. Second, 
attitude change in situations involving conflict between targeted in-groups and a 
perceived representative from another group will be addressed. Specifically, we will 
examine the persuasive effects o f a threat message and various ways that salience and
9
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group identity might alter how a personally relevant threat message is processed. In 
addition to these factors, we address how in-groups may maintain bias, even after the 
initial message that created bias has been recanted.
Regardless of the specific consequence of threat and conflict that we examine, 
group identity in respect to these variables dictates salience as the important mechanism 
(Turner et al., 1987; Turner, 1999). In subsequent sections, we postulate that conditions 
that alter the salience between groups not only exacerbate or lessen bias, but might also 
apply to persuasion and belief perseverance, under the assumption that IRT conditions do 
not represent a unique condition in which salience mechanisms may respond differently. 
As research of this specific nature has not been previously conducted, it may be the case 
that previously researched mechanisms of salience may produce different outcomes due 
to IRT conditions. For instance, it may be the case that numerous environmental factors 
associated with “live” confrontation and criticism, normally avoided in laboratory 
studies, may confound or provide different mechanisms by which salience operates. 
However, by assuming that previous research regarding salient contrast and bias applies 
to IRT conditions, a comparison can be conducted between previous research and the 
current study.
To that extent, we propose four specific factors, including group ideological 
membership, identity, source of the message, and the degree that a message applies to the 
number of members in a group that hypothetically contribute to our three areas of 
interest. First, we examine a more abstract influence of salience by exploring the 
possibility that group ideologies and norms may influence how an individual responds to 
a threat message. Second, salience of a threat situation is hypothesized to be altered by
10
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
the perceived group affiliation from which the threat comes. Specifically, threat 
presented by a perceived in-group member should produce different outcomes than threat 
presented by a perceived out-group member. Third, salience will differ in regards to the 
degree of inclusiveness that the threat represents to the group. That is, threats that target 
a few members of a group will produce different outcomes than threats that target the 
entire group. Fourth, salience of a threat situation will differ depending on the amount of 
personally invested identity with a particular group.
Ideological Differences as Precursors of Bias and Persuasion 
When voluntary social groups are examined, it allows the opportunity to explore 
a frequently neglected factor in social identity research. Although multiple researchers 
have examined nationalities or group differences and the subsequent role of norms with 
in-group bias, few researchers have examined the specific, pre-existing, and personally 
chosen groups represented in an IRT scenario. Research using MGP makes ideology 
irrelevant as the tendency to accentuate group differences was created within the context 
of newly created, non-invested groups (see Brewer, 1979, for a review). Likewise, 
researchers who examine groups within the context of other groups use non-voluntary 
identity aspects such as gender (Oakes et al., 1991) or nationality (Haslam et al., 1995). 
Although the above studies do represent global social groups, we suggest that 
membership in groups such as gender or nationality represent a greater degree of 
abstraction, or broader categorization (Turner et al., 1987) of group identity compared to 
groups whose memberships represent a personal choice.
In order to examine ideology as a potential factor of identity and bias, additional 
theorizing is necessary to justify its place within self-categorization theory. The idea that
11
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ideology might influence the degree of bias created is dependent on differences between 
norms (i.e., the shared beliefs, behaviors, and features of a group) and how norms dictate 
in-group/out-group interaction. The fundamental process with self-categorization 
involves a processing of the norms of a given group. For instance, the process of 
comparative and normative fit (Haslam & Turner, 1992) involves the comparison of the 
common beliefs, behaviors, and features of an in-group compared to the expected 
common beliefs, behaviors, and features of an out-group. In other words, individuals 
who perceive themselves as similar to a potential group evaluate that similarity on the 
perceived norms of the group in question. Applied to group interaction, it follows that 
norms not only exist for beliefs about acceptable behavior within the in-group, but also 
exist for dictating interaction with out-groups. These norms that dictate behavior towards 
out-group members may be important within the context of how group belief and 
ideology are expressed and promoted.
However, can differing norms and beliefs exacerbate or reduce negative feelings 
towards groups who are similar or different from a group receiving a threat message? 
Research suggests that the answer is yes, but several important caveats should be 
considered. With regards to the group norms and influencing bias, the context of social 
identity research demonstrates that group held norms dictate interaction with out-groups 
and in-group bias. Jetten, Spears, & Manstead (1996) demonstrated that in-group norms 
such as fairness versus discrimination altered the degree of bias produced in a classical 
Tajfel allocation task. Specifically, after groups were labeled as detailperceivers they 
performed a money allocation task to either detail perceivers or global perceivers. 
Fairness and discrimination were manipulated by informing participants that 10 of the 15
12
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detail perceivers distributed money equally (fairness condition) or distributed money 
predominantly to themselves. Results within this MGP variant demonstrated that groups 
that had fairness as an in-group norm were significantly less biased in allocation, whereas 
the greatest amount of bias occurred with in-group prejudice norms (but also see Jost & 
Ross, 1999, for similar findings).
Although these findings demonstrate that group norms can influence bias, it is 
also important to note that the theoretical principals of SCT propose that salient contrast 
is an environmentally specific function (Turner et al., 1987). As such, salient contrast 
and the principals of SIT should generally dictate bias and prejudice on a situation to 
situation basis, and pre-existing entrenched individual group attitudes are only predictive 
of bias within these contrast conditions. For instance, Haslam and colleagues (1992) 
showed that in-group bias was dependent on other groups that were considered more or 
less favorable when determining bias towards a specific group. This theoretical 
assumption is also strengthened by research showing that stereotype consensus within a 
group and applicability of stereotype beliefs contribute to in-group bias and favoritism 
(Haslam et al., 1996, Haslam et al., 1999; Haslam & Wilson, 2000). Essentially, group 
norms do influence bias, but are heavily influenced by categorical relevance, salient 
contrast, and the universality of those norms.
The above findings establish the role of norms towards explaining intra-group 
differentiation, but do not necessarily address attitudinal approaches towards bias. As an 
example, attitudes and traits such as right-wing authoritarianism (Altemeyer, 1981; 1988) 
or social dominance orientation (Pratto, Sidanius, Stallworth, & Malle, 1994) have been 
associated with prejudice and are expected to predict prejudice and bias on an individual
13
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level, but not as a function of relevant group-contrast. Specifically, research regarding 
social dominance orientation has been recently debated in social identity. Researchers 
supporting a social dominance theory suggest that attitudes are pre-extant to salient 
contrast (Sidanius & Pratto, 1999), whereas SCT researchers support the mechanism of 
salient contrast as a precursor to attitudinal biases (Tinner & Reynolds, 2003). 
Researchers examining this question have shown that in particular (at least with SDO), a 
relationship between bias and social dominance does not occur when identity with a 
particular group is not invoked, but does relate when individuals are provided contrast in 
terms of identity groups (Schmitt, Branscombe, & Kappen, 2003, Wilson & Liu, 2003, 
but also see Haslam & Wilson, 2000). Thus, the overall answer to this debate suggests 
that pre-existing attitude traits are predictive of prejudice and bias, but only when 
participants are cognitively made aware of themselves verses others.
In context of the current study, we wish to explore the possibility that within 
salient contrast between groups, as IRT should create, pre-existing and group specific 
held beliefs and norms may potentially influence bias. In other words, do norms 
representing different group beliefs inherently contain more of a disposition for hostility 
or bias towards similar and different groups? For example, is it the case that two groups 
with very differing ideologies (i.e., a fraternity compared to a Christian religious group) 
when presented with the exact same threat message, will report different degrees of bias 
because of inherent norms and beliefs of a particular organization?
The answer to this question provides one of two potentially interesting outcomes 
in the context of SCT and salient contrast. Should a lack of differences between differing 
ideologies (e.g., advocacy groups as opposed to religious groups) occur, then these
14
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findings would further support the current understanding of SCT, in the sense that 
regardless o f specific ideological norms, bias and evaluation of threatening groups are 
general social functions of salient contrast and the maintenance of self-esteem of its 
group members (e.g. Turner et al., 1987, Tajfel & Turner, 1979). Similarly, these 
findings would also support the conception of previous research between religion and 
prejudice that suggests it is not the specific beliefs themselves that contribute to 
prejudice, but rather the militant way in which beliefs are held and maintained (Laythe, 
Finkel, & Kirkpatrick, 2001; Laythe, Finkel, Bringle, & Kirkpatrick, 2002). In other 
words, the specific ideology does not seem to dictate prejudice, but a need to maintain 
and enforce these beliefs do. In contrast, should differences in bias and persuasion occur 
due to differing types of groups, results would lend more specific support to a “triggered 
trait theory” as demonstrated by Schmitt et al. (2003) and Wilson and Liu (2003). In 
essence, specific norms or types of beliefs do in fact generate more bias than others, at 
least in the context of salient contrast as our IRT conditions are expected to produce. 
These findings would suggest that specific norms held by specific types of groups do 
promote ideologies o f superiority within an individual’s group as a whole, and in turn, as 
individuals identify with that group, they engage in those norms when dealing with other 
groups.
Identity and In-Group Bias in Response to Threat Situations
Previous research has examined bias as a result of inter-group comparison 
(Haslam et al., 1995). Researchers have also contrasted the effects of comparative and 
normative fit as a prerequisite for salient contrast (Oakes et al., 1991). However, to date, 
researchers have not addressed the conditions of salient contrast when there is an actual
15
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personally relevant threat between two groups. In order to examine realistic conflict and 
the threat associated with it, we apply our proposed salience factors to in-group bias 
when the nature of group interaction is designed to be critical of the in-group. As a 
result, we examine both traditional findings in bias research, as well as some exceptions 
that might result because of IRT conditions.
Source and Degree of Threat as Factors of In-Group Bias
When a situation involves threat, the source of the threat message as either an in­
group or out-group member may alter how the threat is received according to SCT 
principals of comparative and normative fit (Reynolds, Turner, & Haslam, 2000). 
Previous researchers suggest that threat will generally produce comparative fit if the 
source of a threat message is an out-group member. Logically, when two groups are 
presented as dissimilar to each other, in-group bias seems likely given previous research 
using MGP (Tajfel et al., 1971) that has demonstrated in-group bias under conditions that 
minimize group identity. Likewise, comparative fit is easily induced by only providing a 
specific out-group against which to compare, unlike Haslam et al., (1992) who purposely 
altered the number of group comparisons. Thus, for the current situation that openly 
creates conflict, comparative fit and subsequent differentiation should be relatively easy 
to establish for in-group members (Haslam et al., 1992; Oakes et al., 1991). Normative 
fit, on the other hand, may play a significant role when a threat comes from a perceived 
in-group member. More specifically, group criticism may be expected from another 
group with potentially different agendas and goals, but threat coming from a perceived 
in-group member is inconsistent with the idea of what an in-group member should 
believe. As an example, Oakes and colleagues (1991), in an experimental manipulation
16
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pitting arts students versus science students, demonstrated the importance of normative 
fit when producing salient contrast between in-groups and out-groups. Specifically, these 
researchers found that arts students who produced inconsistent expected views about a 
given issue had their views explained by internal attributions (e.g., personality) by 
science students as opposed to external attributions (e.g., group influence). When the 
other group’s views were inconsistent with expected stereotypes, less group cohesion was 
perceived, and as a consequence, less comparative fit between groups occurred. As a 
result, the salient contrast between groups lessened (Oakes et al., 1991).
In essence, Turner et al. (1987) proposes that comparative and normative fit is the 
mechanism of group differentiation and subsequent bias. In turn, Oakes et al. (1991) 
demonstrated that a lack of normative fit inhibited comparative fit. Thus, one 
interpretation of this research suggests that less normative fit results in less contrast, and 
subsequently less bias. In conjunction with these findings, we suggest that normative fit 
will be less when threat is presented by an in-group member. A message that is counter- 
attitudinal to an in-group presented by a member who is supposed to be similar creates a 
conflict between expectations of in-group beliefs and the views actually espoused.
There are however, exceptions to this rule when the nature of the message 
involves criticism. For instance, Moreland and McMinn (1999) demonstrated that ex­
members of a particular group who criticized completed projects by the in-group created 
more distress and rejection compared to criticism from an unrelated group (i.e., out­
group). Other researchers (see Hornsey & Imani, 2004 for a general review) have 
demonstrated that criticism from in-group members tends to be severe towards in-group 
members who do not conform (Abrams, Marques, Bown, & Henson, 2000) or are
17
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disloyal (Branscombe, Wann, Noel, & Coleman, 1993). Taking the above research into 
account within an IRT scenario where direct criticism is applied to group behavior, it is 
possible that a “black sheep effect” (Homsey & Imani, 2004, p 366, but also see 
Hornsey, Oppes, & Svensson, 2002) might occur. In other words, a sense of betrayal 
stemming from the presentation of criticism from another organization with similar 
ideologies and beliefs (i.e., an in-group) may in fact produce more bias, than from an 
out-group where criticism is perhaps more expected.
In essence, the general theoretical mechanisms of SCT would suggest that 
messages from an in-group member will generate less bias than an out-group member. 
However, other research demonstrates a “black sheep effect”, or the result of betrayal of 
an in-group by a particular member. Given the concept of IRT conditions as a threat 
condition (e.g., criticism; Moreland & McMinn, 1999), either effect could be likely, 
depending on how severely participants perceive and interpret the message. If 
participants find the criticism tolerable, stimulating favorability towards an in-group 
member, bias could be lessened, as Oakes and colleagues (1991) describe. In contrast, if 
the criticism is seen as severe, a black sheep effect seems more likely. As a tentative 
hypothesis we expect the former to occur, but leave open the possibility that the latter is 
also probable. Thus, following Oakes et al, (1991), we would expect that lesser degrees o f 
salience in an in-group presented message, in part due to poor normative fit, will 
produce less bias compared to an out-group presented message.
A secondary issue with salience represents the degree of threat that another group 
or individual presents to an in-group. Previous research has treated threat as a condition 
that is either present or absent. For instance, Spears, Doosje, and Ellemers (1997) used
18
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psychology, art, and physics majors as existing groups and had these groups compare 
specific traits, such as intelligence or creativity. Threat was defined as a challenge to 
status by comparing groups that perceived themselves as disadvantaged when compared 
to a specific trait (e.g., psychology students compared to art students on creativity). In 
this example, creativity represents an evaluative trait in which art majors are perceived as 
more advantaged compared to psychology majors. As a result, psychology majors 
perceive threat because of their disadvantaged status (also see Ellemers, Spears, & 
Doosje, 2002; Branscombe et al., 1999; Spears, Doosje, & Ellemers, 1999). Although 
these findings establish the validity of threat as a reaction to an out-group, they do not 
address the possibility that the degree of threat might also alter the reaction. In the above 
example, threat is a specific trait that is not varied in its severity or application.
Likewise, Spears et al. (1997) do not address how psychology students would rate art 
students if they were addressed as slightly more creative compared to extremely more 
creative. In sum, threat researchers have not directly manipulated the degree of threat 
presented by a threat message.
Under the assumption that threat towards an in-group produces salient 
comparison conditions that can produce bias (Spears et al., 1997), there is evidence to 
suggest that the degree of threat presented alters the amount of in-group bias produced. 
This proposition is based upon research examining how well traits or attributes fit a 
particular in-group or out-group. Reynolds et al. (2000) recently demonstrated that 
typicality (i.e., to what degree traits apply to the whole group) of positive traits resulted 
in more in-group bias. Specifically, less attributions of negative traits were assigned to 
out-groups when the particular negative trait was not typical of either in-groups or out-
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groups. Likewise, overall discrimination was less when traits were not typical of any 
given group. Applied to a content message that is threatening to members o f an in-group, 
these findings suggest that one method of varying the degree of threat is to alter the 
degree that a particular threat is applicable to group members. We propose that the 
degree to which a threat applies to all or few members of an in-group will produce 
different amounts of bias. In a threat situation where only a few members of a group are 
criticized, it is more likely that overall members o f the group would not consider these 
accusations typical to the group as a whole. Similarly, the supposed negative behaviors 
of a few members of a particular group can be dismissed as behavior induced by 
situational circumstances (Crisp et al., 2001), in turn reducing any perceived threat to the 
in-group. Conversely, threat that applies to all the members of the group should establish 
greater degrees of bias, because of its applicability to every member of the group. Thus, 
we would expect that low inclusion threat conditions (i.e., few  members) will produce 
less bias than high inclusion conditions (i.e., all members).
Within Group Identity as a Factor of In-Group Bias
Although we propose that the overall inclusion of threat is a potential source of 
in-group bias, the overall level of identification with a particular group by its members 
would also alter individual perceptions of bias. One of the central themes when 
examining groups’ reactions to threat involves the reaction to threat as either high or low 
identifiers within an in-group (Branscombe et al., 1999; Spears et al., 1999). High 
identifiers within a group are more prone to exhibit depersonalization and in-group bias, 
whereas low identifiers exhibit depersonalization only to the extent that it furthers group 
and, indirectly, personal status improvement (Doosje, Spears, & Ellmers, 2002; Spears et
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al., 1997). These findings lead us to expect that the salience of threat will differ for 
individuals with a high degree of investment or personal meaning placed within a group, 
versus group members who do not place a great degree of investment within the group.
In conjunction with the level of inclusion of threat, we propose that a threat condition that 
includes the group as a whole (i.e., high inclusion) will be less threatening and create less 
in-group bias with low identity members as opposed to high identity members (Doosje et 
al., 2002; Spears et al., 1997). Likewise, we expect that in low inclusion threat 
conditions (i.e., threat targeting a few members), threat will be significantly less than our 
more inclusive threat condition for low identity members.
This expectation is based on the premise of prototypicality, or the degree that 
group members perceive themselves as similar. Previous research demonstrates that high 
identifiers are more likely to perceive the group as more similar to themselves than low 
identifiers (Ellemers et al., 2002). Because we expect greater prototypicality from high 
identifiers, it is logical to assume that individuals who have high degrees of investment 
and commitment in a group will perceive criticism towards a few members of the group 
in the same way as threat that encompasses the whole group. A threat against a few 
members still represents personal threat against their own identity because threats to 
others within the in-group are perceived as threats to themselves (Simon, Pantaleo, & 
Mummendey, 1995; Spears et al., 1997). Conversely, low identifiers do not perceive 
themselves as necessarily similar to others in the in-group. As a result, threat towards 
other members of the group do not personally apply to low identifiers and can be 
personally ignored. In sum, different degrees o f threat inclusion should produce differing
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degrees o f bias for low identity members, but will not significantly alter high identifiers ’ 
ratings o f bias.
Identity and the Response to Threatening Information; 
Persuasion and Belief Perseverance.
In the previous section we discussed how several factors might contribute to the 
creation of in-group bias, but did not address how in-group bias is formed. In the current 
section, we demonstrate the relationships between bias, persuasion, and previously held 
beliefs. The application of these three areas of research implies three general questions 
about attitude change and identity. First, does group identity alter how people 
cognitively process threat information? Second, as a result of that processing, what 
contrast exists between attitude change about the out-group compared to attitude change 
about the in-group? Finally, once a judgment has been made about the content of a 
message and the group that provides it, can these judgments be changed when the 
conditions and information that made the judgments accurate are recanted?
In order to examine these questions, research from both persuasion and belief 
perseverance are particularly important. Researchers who examine persuasion provide 
evidence for examining how negative messages are processed both in and out of the 
context of group identity. Petty and Cacioppo’s (1986) Elaboration Likelihood Model 
allows us to examine differences in how negative messages are cognitively processed and 
resultant attitude changes. In contrast, research by Anderson and Lindsay (1998) 
provides a model for how individuals persist in their individual beliefs and the conditions 
necessary to counter that persistence. Evidence for why beliefs persist can explain why 
attitudes about the in-group may not change when given negative information. Likewise,
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belief perseverance literature can address our final question about the negation of bias 
and the attitudes about the in-group and out-group that result from threat. In the 
following sections, we address the theoretical background behind persuasion and belief 
perserverance, the unique conditions created with group identity in a conflict/threat 
situation, and an elaboration of our three questions.
Theoretical Background: Persuasion and Belief Perseverance 
Persuasion
According to the Elaboration Likelihood Model (ELM; Petty & Cacioppo, 1986), 
persuasion is a function of involvement and message quality. When individuals find that 
a message is personally relevant to them they engage in central processing, or a careful 
scrutiny of the content o f a message in terms of its merits and faults. The result of central 
processing is that high quality arguments are more persuasive than low quality 
arguments. Conversely, if a message is not processed centrally, ELM states that 
peripheral processing occurs. That is, the audience does not pay attention to the content 
of the argument, but takes persuasive cues from the persuader, the environment of the 
room, or previously established norms (Petty, Cacioppo, & Schumann, 1983; Petty & 
Cacioppo, 1990).
According to ELM, the variable of importance that determines whether central or 
peripheral processing occurs is personal relevance, or the degree of involvement with a 
persuasive topic. Individuals who are involved with a persuasive message engage in 
greater degrees of central processing than those who are not involved with a persuasive 
topic (Petty et al., 1983). For instance, Petty and Cacioppo (1979) demonstrated that 
conditions where a message was considered highly relevant and important produced more
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scrutiny and analysis of the argument compared to conditions where the message content 
was not perceived as personally relevant. In contrast, when personal relevance is low, 
other peripheral persuasive cues become important in processing information. For 
instance, Heesacker, Petty, and Cacioppo (1983) found that the perceived credibility of a 
source is more influential to persuasion when individuals do not perceive a message as 
personally relevant. Specifically, the peripheral cue of credibility was more persuasive 
than the quality of the argument when individuals were not motivated to scrutinize the 
message because o f its lack of relevance. In sum, the greater the involvement, the more 
careful the scrutiny of the argument. Conversely, the less involved an individual is in a 
particular topic, the more likely non-argument based assessment occurs (Petty & 
Cacioppo, 1984).
Belief Perseverance
In contrast to persuasion, which represents changes in opinions and belief, belief 
perseverance is the tendency to maintain beliefs even when contrary evidence is 
provided. The perseverance of belief is the final stage in maintaining previously 
developed naive theories, or knowledge structures that assume causal relations between 
people, things, or events (Anderson & Lindsay, 1998). It is our naive theories about 
social events (i.e., the causal relations we assume about groups) that fuel our attitudes 
about particular groups. Thus, our expectations derive our attitudes (Anderson, 1995a, 
1995b; Anderson & Lindsay 1998). As an example of how differing naive theories alter 
our perceptions of events, Sedikides and Anderson (1992) demonstrated that individuals’ 
explanations about a defector radically differed as a function of whether or not the 
defector was described as American or Soviet. Specifically, Soviet defectors were
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perceived by Americans as oppressed and noble, whereas American defectors were seen 
in a negative context.
According to Anderson and Lindsay, (1998) the perseverance of beliefs occurs as 
a function of several criteria. First, the individual will persevere in his or her beliefs if 
time, cognitive resources, and/or motivation are not available. In other words, time and 
resources must favor the analysis of a competing naive theory, but motivation must also 
exist to examine previously held beliefs. If these conditions are not met, the previously 
held belief will persevere. However, even if time, resources, and the motivation are 
available to examine a previously held belief, subsequent research has demonstrated that 
several cognitive biases may still occur. These cognitive biases result from the causal 
nature of the naive theory that is previously held. For instance, Slusher and Anderson 
(1987) demonstrated that participants will overestimate the frequency of associations of 
word pairs that promote a previously held naive theory. Likewise, individuals will often 
distort data to match their previously held theories (e.g., Sedikides & Anderson, 1992). 
Researchers have also demonstrated that individuals who produce arguments or 
justification for their beliefs tend to be resilient to belief change (Anderson, 1983). The 
result of these studies suggests that within social situations the examination of an 
alternate theory does not necessarily mean an unbiased examination of new information.
Identity and Bias. Persuasion, and Belief Perseverance Applied to Realistic Threat 
In the previous section we discussed four factors (i.e., group ideology, identity, 
source of the message, and message inclusion) that we propose induce different degrees 
of salience between groups and the resultant in-group bias that can occur. In order to 
examine how the same salience factors apply to our inquiries about persuasion and
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attitude change, it is necessary to address three important theoretical questions. The first 
question involves how factors that influence in-group bias likely affect how individuals 
process information. Answering this question allows us to examine persuasion with the 
use of factors that affect salience and create in-group bias. The second question asks 
which unique conditions occur when persuasion is applied to threat of an in-group’s 
sense of personal value. The third question addresses the issue of negative persuasion, or 
the effect a counter-attitudinal message has on listeners. Elaboration on this question 
defines the conditions that are unique to the current experiment with regards to the 
persuasive ability of threat.
To address the relationship between bias and persuasion it is important to 
demonstrate three connections between in-group norms, naive theories and judgment. 
First, the construction of naive theories and the causal relationships derived from them 
are in part derived from group membership. More specifically, identity, or sense of self 
in regards to the environment, is developed by the interplay of affiliation with groups to 
which one does and does not belong (Hogg & Turner, 1987). Affiliation is then dictated 
by the similar and dissimilar norms and characteristics of any particular group 
comparison. Second, if in-group norms can be considered naive theories, then they are 
used to create judgments about social situations (Anderson, 1995a, 1995b). Adherence to 
the norms of an in-group provides a sense o f belonging, as well as common naive 
theories that result in positive or negative attitudes about other groups. Thus, similarities 
between in-group members and differences between out-group members are judged as a 
function of the assumptions that a group holds (Anderson, 1995a, 1995b; Turner et al., 
1987). Finally, cognitive processing is the resultant process that occurs when individuals
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judge other groups. The evaluation of a persuasive message is a process that examines 
whether it is pro-attitudinal or counter-attitudinal, and subsequently is elaborated on for 
its merits either by scrutinizing the argument itself or contextual information (Petty & 
Cacioppo, 1986). Within the context of group affiliation, the content of a message as 
pro-attitudinal or counter-attitudinal is gauged by the norms of the group with which a 
person is affiliated. A judgment is made about the message, and sometimes the presenter 
of the message, as a result of this elaboration.
The logical conclusion of these points suggests that any resultant judgment is a 
process of cognitive elaboration based on naive theories to which an in-group adheres. 
In-group bias represents a judgment of another group’s qualities as inferior to the in­
group. As a result, our above consideration of naive theories and cognitive elaboration 
apply to the judgments involving in-group bias and dictate that conditions creating bias 
first alter the cognitive processing that allows individuals to come to a negative 
conclusion about another group.
Our second question involves explaining what is unique about our threat 
conditions within the current study. The current study seeks to ascertain the degree to 
which group-members persist in their beliefs about the “goodness” of their particular 
group. Generally, previous researchers have examined persuasion when the content of 
the message does not directly address the value of the group itself (e.g., Petty &
Cacioppo, 1979, Petty, Rennier, & Cacioppo, 1987). Likewise, research that involves in­
group persuasion does not invoke a persuasive message that is counter to the relevance 
and value of the group (e.g., McGarty et al., 1994). Although a particular attitude about a 
specific persuasive message may differ between groups, the resultant attitude change only
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represents one specific naive theory that a group holds. In contrast, by questioning the 
overall value of the group, a global threat is produced to a groups’ status and standing. 
Thus, the current study is interested in the persuasive ability of a message that questions 
an in-group’s sense of worth and standing in a social context. Although we believe that 
addressing individual naive theories that in-groups hold would produce different degrees 
of cognitive processing and potential bias, we have “stacked the deck” so to speak. By 
focusing the content of the persuasive message towards criticizing the group’s value, we 
exacerbate the relevance of the message for an in-group. In turn, alterations of the 
strength of the threat message by differing conditions that alter salience should produce 
different cognitive processing by in-groups.
Finally, because the nature of our experiment involves presenting counter- 
attitudinal messages to in-groups, it is important to realize that counter-attitudinal 
messages are processed differently than pro-attitudinal messages, regardless of group 
membership. For instance, Cacioppo and Petty (1979) demonstrated that levels of 
persuasion and neutral thoughts about a counter-attitudinal message are significantly less 
than a pro-attitudinal message. Conversely, counter arguments tend to be greater with 
counter-attitudinal messages. Similarly, when examining the degree of involvement with 
a persuasive message, Petty and Cacioppo (1979) found that investment within a 
particular belief produces greater degrees of negative attitudes and greater degrees of 
arguments against the counter-attitudinal message. These examinations of negative 
messaging suggest that threat messages towards an in-group are not received well, 
produce less persuasion than pro-attitudinal messages, but are contemplated more than 
pro-attitudinal arguments. As a result of these findings, it is important to note that an
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examination of threat within the context of persuasion is an examination of what 
conditions produce the most anti-persuasion. Our experiment examines both central and 
peripheral processing in regards to how much in-groups are persuaded by a threat 
message. We discuss specific cognitive processing predictions below.
Identity and Threat Message Processing: Central or Peripheral?
In our examination of persuasion and salient contrast within IRT conditions, we 
first examine two variables that could individually or jointly contribute to the positive or 
negative evaluation of a critical message. The essence of the following examination of 
central and peripheral processing is that both salient contrast invoked by manipulations of 
source and inclusion, as well as individual participant’s degrees of central or peripheral 
processing, will contribute to positive or negative responses towards an IRT message. In 
other words, individual (and not condition determined) measures of central and 
peripheral processing in the current study are defined as individual random variables. 
Each participant within a specific organization will process a threat message on an 
individual basis. In turn, positive and negative responses are expected to vary as a 
function of either central or peripheral processing. We expect that this relationship is 
further influenced by group applied salience manipulations in terms of source and 
inclusion. These manipulations will further contribute to central and peripheral 
processing of participants within groups and towards predicting positive and negative 
outcomes.
Research examining persuasion often demonstrates differing outcomes based on 
positive or negative elaborations made about a particular manipulated condition. Initial 
studies performed by persuasion researchers (e.g. Petty & Cacioppo, 1979 but also see
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Cacioppo & Petty, 1979) examined attitude change in the context of directly 
manipulating conditions of persuasion that were later defined as central and peripheral 
approaches. For example, Cacioppo and Petty (1979) altered involvement in the message 
as either high or low and used the subsequent differences in the amount of positive and 
negative statements made to demonstrate a peripheral or central approach to argument 
analysis. These findings involving personal relevance as a manipulation provide evidence 
of processing differences by examining the attitudinal outcomes of the statements made 
by participants. The summation of this research demonstrates (as a general principal) 
that as peripheral processing increases, negative statements increase for arguments (Petty 
& Cacioppo, 1979; Petty, et al., 1983). These findings make sense in the context of 
identity and salient contrast, in that negative responses represent a lack o f persuasion, 
whereas positive responses represent favorable reaction to a message, and can be 
construed as favorable or persuasive outcome of the message on participants. One o f the 
general assumptions following our expectations fo r positive and negative responses 
regards the above findings, in that we would expect in a realistic threat scenario that 
central processing will be inversely related to the amount o f negative statements 
producedfrom an argument (Petty & Cacioppo, 1979; Petty et al., 1983).
As such, the evaluation of positive and negative responses in an IRT scenario 
provide the overall evaluation and validity of a threat message. However, there are 
alternate assumptions with regards to central and peripheral processing and the likely 
positive or negative outcomes that occur from processing a threat message. Our current 
assumption for the above hypothesis is that a participant engaging in peripheral 
processing could assess the message using previous assumptions, and in turn rate a threat
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the group (4.09 versus 2.09, r(l,179) = 6.41 p  = .000). Additionally, participants 
perceived the statement applying to everyone in the group in the low inclusion condition 
compared to the high inclusion condition (2.73 versus 1.95, /( l,179) = 2.61,/j = .01).
Both of these findings, although very low scores in terms of range, suggest that 
the nature of the message applying to only a few members compared to all of the 
members of a target group was perceived and a “perceived typicality” effect took place 
(e.g. Reynolds et al., 2000). In essence, participants were less willing to accept the 
group’s responsibility for the message when the threat applied to everyone in the group. 
In contrast, the accusation of only a few members was more readily accepted, providing 
evidence that high and low inclusion conditions were differently perceived.
Results Overview
For each of our principal analyses regarding in-group bias, persuasion variables, 
and persistence of bfas, preliminary subject level ANOVAs were conducted. The goal of 
these analyses are to test our exploratory hypotheses involving naturally occurring 
differences in bias and persuasion due to the type of group to which individuals have 
invested identity. These analyses were conducted before HLM analyses to determine if 
additional variables should be included in the model to account for consistent differences 
in scores due to group type.
Following these ANOVAS, preliminary HLM model testing is reported, which 
determines the goodness of fit by comparing the variance explained by the unrestricted, 
predictor only, and predictors and manipulation HLM models. In addition, the amount of 
subject and group level variation of the dependent variable is reported, and this variation 
is tested to determine if sufficient between group variation exists to conduct a subjects
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nested within groups HLM model. The addition of an Inclusion X Source interaction 
term is also tested against the principal results model to determine if an interaction of 
these two Level-2 predictors is relevant to the principal model. Lastly, results are 
reported for the final HLM model used to test the hypotheses outlined in the introduction. 
These hypotheses are repeated in an introductory paragraph. A brief tutorial on 
interpreting HLM output is provided in Appendix A.
Results Section 1: HLM Models of In-Group Bias 
Descriptive Statistics: Aggregate Sample
In order to provide general relationships with the overall sample and descriptive 
statistics for each college or university sub-population, Table 1 provides dependant 
variables of interest separated by manipulation. Table 2 provides demographic 
information separated by college or university sampled. Table 3 provides sample 
correlations between dependent variables for the aggregate sample.
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TABLE 1
Means and Standard Deviations o f Relevant Variables by Condition
Condition 
N Group Type BIAS
Low Inc In-Group
20 Fraternity -4.31 (3.51)
9 Religious -1.84 (1.87)
14 Sorority -2.52 (2.50)
Aggregate -2.89
Low Inc Out-Group
20 Fraternity -3.88 (1.93)
12 Religious -2.16 (2.30)
7 Advocacy -2.91 (1.71)
Aggregate -2.98
High Inc In-Group
49 Sorority -6 . 1 2 (2.47)
5 Religious -1.97 (2.15)
6  Advocacy -3.74 (1 .0 2 )
Aggregate -3.94
High Inc Out-Group
27 Fraternity -4.25 (2.39)
5 Religious -6.93 (2.56)
6  Advocacy -4.96 (1.53)
Aggregate -5.38
RESBIAS NEGPER ARGPER GRPPER VALUE RESVALUE IDENTITY
-2.59(3.03) 0.38(0.33) 0.57(0.36) 0.28(0.31) -0.55 (2.61)-0.90 (2.19) 4.88(1.07)
-1.44(1.60) 0.25(0.30) 0.48(0.26) 0.55(0.26) -0.22(1.30) 0.00(1.50) 5.25(1.08)
-0.75(2.30) 0.23(0.31) 0.61 (0.30) 0.70(0.32) -0.71 (1.54) 0.21 (1.12) 5.01(1.14)
-1.59 0.29 0.55 0.51 -0.49 -0.23 5.05
-2.66(2.13) 0.39(0.35) 0.58(0.25) 0.46(0.32) 1.05 (2.70) -0.05 (2.48) 4.99 (1.23)
-1.20(2.49) 0.28(0.26) 0.67(0.11) 0.48(0.27) -0.46 (1.87)-1.29 (2.97) 5.27 (1.36)
-1.67(1.78) 0.45(0.18) 0.63 (0.21) 0.43(0.24) -2.42 (1.90)-1.14 (1.57) 4.89 (1.32)
-1.84 0.37 0.63 0.45 -0.60 -0.82 5.05
-2.90(2.37) 0.59(0.30) 0.53 (0.25) 0.36(0.25) 0.31 (1.57) 0.27(1.55) 5.06(0.98) 
-1.12(0.77) 0.26(0.24) 0.71 (0.22) 0.52(0.30) -1.20 (1.64)-0.20 (0.84) 5.10 (1.59)
-2.86(1.16) 0.60(0.26) 0.62(0.13) 0.26(0.16) -1.07 (1.42)-1.40 (2.26) 5.00 (0.68)
-2.29 0.48 0.62 0.38 -0.65 -0.31 5.07
-3.05(2.46)0.33(0.34) 0.67(0.36) 0.45(0.34) -0.67 (1.49)-0.26 (1.50) 5.00 (1.26)
-4.36(1.05)0.28(0.38) 0.46(0.31) 0.42(0.21) -1.40(1.67)-1.40(2.40) 4.10(1.94)
-0.38 (2.48) 0.61 (0.25) 0.41 (0.27) 0.41 (0.27) -0.17 (0.41) -0.67 (1.21) 6.08 (0.99)
-2.59 0.41 0.51 0.43 -0.74 -0.78 5.06
ot-"-
Note: BIAS = Manipulation bias score; RESBIAS = Bias score after message negation; NEGPER: Percent of total negative statements 
made; ARGPER = Percent of total argument focused statements; GRPPER = Percent of total statements that focus on participant’s group; 
VALUE = Participants perceived value of group; RESVALUE = Participant perceived value of group after message negation; IDENTITY 


















































Demographic Variables by College or University
Variables Site 1 Site 2 Site 3 Site 4
Sample Size 127 34 14 5
Relevant Means
Age 20.03(1.51) 21.76 (7.44) 20.50(1.69) 20.8 (.83)
Relevant Percentage Of.
Females 45.0% 47.1% 1 0 0 .0 % 80.0%
Males 55.0% 52.9% 0 .0 % 2 0 .0 %
Freshmen or Sophomores 57.5% 35.3% 50.0% 0 .0 %
Juniors or Seniors 42.5% 64.7% 50.0% 1 0 0 .0 %
Caucasians 96.0% 97.1% 1 0 0 .0 % 1 0 0 .0 %
Attends Most or All Meetings 1 0 0 .0 % 8 8 .2 % 1 0 0 .0 % 1 0 0 .0 %


















































Pearson Correlations o f Relevant Variables, Aggregate Sample
Variables 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
1 .Bias 1 .62** -.36** .18* .18* -.07 -.05 -.23**
2.Residual Bias 1 - .1 1 .07 .1 1 -.07 -.05 - . 1 0
3.Negative % 1 -.33** _ 4 4 ** - . 0 2 .09 .1 0
4.Argument % 1 .41** -.04 .0 0 - .1 0
5.Group % 1 .03 -.05 -.07
6  .Value Diff 1 .51** - .0 1


















































Preliminary Analyses of Bias Group Differences
In order to examine potential differences in in-group bias due to the type of group 
(e.g. Fraternity, Sorority, Religious Group, or Advocacy), a series of one-way ANOVAs 
were conducted within each manipulation type. Tukey post-hoc tests were employed to 
determine any consistent differences of bias between individual groups within 
manipulations. The only significant ANOVA was in the high inclusion/in-group 
manipulation (F(2,57) = 8.946, p  < .000). Subsequent examination of the groups within 
this condition indicated that a religious group demonstrated significantly more bias in 
comparison to other groups (-6.13 versus -3.74 and -1.98,p 's  < .05). These few and non- 
consistent findings suggest that in-group bias does not consistently differ due to 
membership in differing organizations. Because no other consistent or significant 
differences were found, this score was considered a naturally deviating score, and a 
group difference variable was not included in the model.
Preliminary Fit of HLM Model: In-Group Bias
The examination of an unspecified HLM model with in-group bias as an outcome 
variable indicated an intra-class correlation (ICC (r)) of .27 indicating that 27% of 
variation for in-group bias resides between groups. Applying a formula for sufficient 
between group variation (see Muthen, Muthen, Asparovhov, & Nguyen, 2006, but also 
see Muthen & Satorra, 1995 for an applied example) provides a score of 4.71(> 2.00), 
indicating sufficient variation to use HLM in subsequent analyses. Reported deviance for 
the unspecified model was 849.50. Subsequent significant reductions in this deviation 
score when testing additional models represents a better fit.
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Preliminary Fit of Model: In-Group Bias. Inclusion of identity as a subject level 
predictor produced a significant reduction in model deviation (849.50 versus 832.25, x2 
(1,11)= 17.24,/? = .000). The inclusion of Level 2 predictors of inclusion and source 
also tended to reduce model deviation (832.25 versus 823.20, x2 (4,8) = 9.04, p  = .059). 
Thus, in each step the addition of both Level 1 and Level 2 predictors of negative 
statements increased the overall fit of the model. The inclusion of an interaction term of 
Inclusion X Source examining mean differences did not significantly reduce variation 
(823.20 versus 822.97, (1,12) = 0.22, p  > .50), and the interaction term within this
model was not significant (p = .64). As such, the interaction term for this model was 
removed from the analysis.
P rim ary  HLM Model: Identity. Inclusion, and Source as Predictors of In-Group 
Bias
In order to examine our first three hypotheses, a 2 level HLM model was 
employed with identity as a subject level predictor, and inclusion and source as Level 2 
predictors. This HLM model will address whether or not (HI) in-group manipulations 
produce less bias than out-group manipulations, (H2) low inclusion manipulations 
produce less bias than high inclusion manipulations, and (H3) whether or not identity 
differentially predicts bias as a function of our manipulations.
Reliability for this model was .65, and approximately 44% of the between level 
variation and 1 2 .6 % of total model variation were explained with the addition of these 
predictors to the model. Both HLM and OLS results are reported in Table 4.
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TABLE 4
HLM and OLS Estimates of Identity, Inclusion, and Source Towards Predicting In-Group Bias
Fixed Effect Coefficient
HLM
S.E. /-ratio /7-value Coefficient
OLS
S.E. /-ratio /7-value
LEVEL 2 Intercept po
ENTRCPT2, yOO -2.83 0.58 -4.83 0 .0 0 1 -3.41 0.32 -10.54 0.000
INCLUS, yOl -1.77 0.69 -2.55 0.031 -1.98 0.36 -5.37 0.000
SOURCE, y02 -0.36 0.69 -0.52 0.610 0.45 0.37 1 .2 2 0.224
LEVEL 1 Identity pi
INTRCPT2, ylO -0.99 0.27 -3.59 0 .0 0 1 -0.99 0.29 -3.35 0 .0 0 1
INCLUS, y ll 0.06 0.30 0 .2 1 0.829 0.06 0.32 0 . 2 0 0.841
SOURCE, yl2 0.58 0.30 1.91 0.056 0.58 0.32 1.78 0.075
Final estimation of variance components: in
S.D. s2 X2 /7-value
Level-2, 0.97 0.94 50.03 .001

















































In terms of main effects as represented by Po intercept scores, results indicate that 
contrary to my hypothesis, the source of the message from an in-group or out-group 
member did not significantly alter the amount of bias created (y = -.36, p  = .61, HI). 
However, the degree of inclusion presented to groups did create significantly different 
degrees o f bias (e.g., H2) indicating that groups who received a low inclusion threat 
showed 1.77 units less bias compared to those who heard a high-inclusion threat (p -  
.03).
In terms of interaction effects between Level 1 identity and Level 2 variables, 
results demonstrate that the degree of social identity that individuals express for a given 
organization is generally associated with greater degrees of bias (y = -.99, p  = .001). In 
addition, results indicate a trend (y = .58, p  = .056) source X bias interaction where a 
significantly greater identity/bias slope is associated with those groups who received a 
message from an in-group member compared to an out-group member. Essentially, bias 
remains consistently negative as identity increases for out-groups, but bias becomes 
greater as identity increases for in-groups. However, in confirmation of our expectation 
that high identifiers would remain equivalently biased regardless of inclusion or source, 
Figure 1 demonstrates that in-group and out-group high identifiers are equivalently and 
highly biased, whereas low identifiers in both conditions differ in their bias ratings (H3).
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Results Section 2: HLM Models Examining Identity and Components of Persuasion
and Threat Evaluation 
Preliminary Analyses of Persuasion Group Differences
Again, in order to examine potential group differences due to group type, a series 
one-way ANOVAs were conducted within each manipulation type for Argument% and 
Negative%. Tukey post-hoc tests were employed to determine any consistent differences 
between individual groups within manipulations. For Argument% none of the ANOVAS 
were significant. For Negative% only the high inclusion/in-group condition approached 
significance (F(2,57) = 3.049,/? = .055). Examination of the individual group means 
within this condition demonstrates that a religious group showed a significantly less 
number of negative statements compared to an advocacy group (.26 versus .60,/? = .05) 
but was not significantly different from the other group (p = .12). As none of these 
isolated group differences show consistent differences across manipulations or dependent 
variables, they were considered as natural variations from an overall distribution of the 
dependent variable, and dummy codes were not included in subsequent models. 
Preliminary Analyses: Identity and Central and Peripheral Processing
In order to examine any potential relationship between individual identity 
invested within a particular organization and its relationship between the degree of 
central and peripheral processing (H7), a Pearson correlation was performed to examine 
the relationship between these two variables. Results indicate that identity is not 
significantly associated with the degree of argument centered statements presented (r = - 
.10,/? = .16). However, any potential correlational relationship could be confounded by 
differential association between identity and central processing due to the different
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conditions presented to participants across groups. A 2-Level HLM model was 
employed to test this possibility.
Preliminary Fit of HLM Model: Argument Centered Statements. Examination of 
an unspecified HLM model with argument centered statements as an outcome variable 
indicates a very small amount of between group variation ICC (r) of .002. The 
application of the Muthen et al., (2006) formula for sufficient between group variation 
provides a score of 1.03, which indicates that insufficient variation is evident to use HLM 
in subsequent analyses. As a result subject level analyses were employed to examine any 
significant variation that could occur due to the manipulations with regards to the 
relationship of identity and argument centered statements.
Identity. Inclusion, and Source as Predictors of Argument Centered Statements. 
An examination of subject level analyses where potential mean variation of argument 
centered statements due to degree of inclusion or source of the message did not show any 
significant effects. More importantly, identity did not significantly predict argument 
centered statements and interaction effects of identity with the manipulations were not 
significant. In summation, identity does not seem to be significantly related to central or 
peripheral processing of the presented messages. These results can be examined in Table 
5.
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TABLE 5
HLM and OLS Estimates of Identity, Inclusion, and Source Towards Predicting Degree ofArgument Centered Statements
HLM
Fixed Effect Coefficient S.E. /-ratio /?-value Coefficient
OLS
S.E. /-ratio /7-value
LEVEL 2 Intercept (30
INTRCPT2, yOO 0.59 0 . 0 2 28.13 0 . 0 0 0
INCLUS, yOl -0 .0 1 0.04 -0.31 0.753
SOURCE, y02 0.05 0.04 1 .1 1 0.270
LEVEL 1 Identity pi
INTRCPT2, ylO -0.03 0 .0 1 -1.38 0.169
INCLUS, yll 0.04 0.04 0.98 0.328
SOURCE, yl2 0 .0 1 0.04 0.26 0.793

















































message much more negatively than a participant engaging in central processing. In this 
scenario, central elaboration on the argument itself may draw participants away from the 
negative connotations denoted by the speaker in terms of tone and accusation. The 
reasoning behind this expectation is that within the IRT context, part of the motivation to 
review a threat message is to invalidate it. Therefore, when a message is carefully 
scrutinized, participants will have the opportunity to invalidate the argument, reducing 
threat and consequence of the message to the group, and in turn reducing overly hostile 
reactions or statements.
This is in contrast to other persuasion research, where primarily central 
processing will evoke more negative evaluations, particularly if the content of the 
message is not strong (i.e. Petty et al. 1983). However, we expect IRT conditions to 
make a difference in this particular series of findings due to personal relevance and threat 
of the current situation. Although previous persuasion research purposely examined 
issues that were not of high personal relevance (e.g., Fabrigar & Petty, 1999), in the 
current IRT scenario participants are motivated to examine the relevance of the threat, 
and if possible disarm it, which promotes the maintenance of well-being and self-esteem 
of the participants (Tajfel & Turner, 1979). Therefore, whether or not the message is 
considered weak or strong, the primary motivation for participants first represent the 
alleviation of threat, and subsequently evaluate the nature of the message itself as a 
strong or weak argument.
However, this is not to say that salience regarding the source of the presentation 
of the message, or the degree to which a threat message is applied to a group will not 
influence central and peripheral arguments and participants’ responses to a threat
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message. Similar to in-group bias, the source of a persuasive message as either an in­
group or out-group could make a difference in how in-group members process and 
evaluate that message. Persuasion literature that examines in-group/out-group sources of 
a persuasive message is similar to previous research examining involvement as a factor 
of persuasion. In other words, personal relevance can be dictated by the group source of 
a message. For instance, McGarty et al., (1994) demonstrated that group membership 
plays a significant central route to persuasion. In this study, researchers manipulated in- 
group/out-group status by asking for participant’s stance on one of two messages 
involving road safety or banning alcohol to prevent brain damage. Results showed that 
agreement with messages were higher when they came from an in-group source, 
regardless of the amount of personal salience or relevance for the participant. 
Additionally, McGarty et al., (1994) demonstrated that as salience increased for an in­
group message, accurate recall of the speaker’s statements increased, whereas an out­
group message demonstrated low message recall rates regardless of salience. The 
overall findings for this research suggest that messages from an out-group member are 
not liked as well as messages from an in-group member, but more importantly, out-group 
messages are not recalled as well, or at all, suggesting a lack of scrupulous examination 
(i.e., peripheral processing) of an out-group argument. Additional research has 
supported the above findings that in-groups apply more scrutiny to in-group messages, 
while generally resisting attitude change from out-groups (e.g. Flemming & Petty, 2000; 
Wilder, 1990), whereas other research has consistently demonstrated differential 
processing dependent on salience and the source of the message as an in-group or out-
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group member (Mackie & Worth, 1989; Mackie Worth, & Asuncion, 1990; Mackie, et 
al., 1992).
The body of these findings suggests that peripheral processing is more likely 
when out-groups present a threat message, which in turn could warrant more negative 
evaluations of the message. In a similar vein, messages from in-group members should 
be evaluated more on the merits of the argument. Applied to our previous expectation 
that peripheral processing is associated with greater degrees of negative statements, we 
would generally expect an interaction of central processing and source. Peripheral 
processing should be more strongly associated with a threat message presented by an 
out-group member generating a greater amount o f negative statements, compared to an 
in-group member presenting a message, where we expect less peripheral processing, and 
in turn, less negative statements.
Likewise, we propose that the inclusiveness of the threat itself might also alter 
how a message is processed and evaluated. As a general principal both Petty and 
Cacioppo (1986) with ELM as well as Turner et al., (1987) with SCT propose that it is 
the personal relevance of the situation, or salience that dictates persuasion and positive 
and negative responses. Regardless of whether or not the message is produced by an in­
group or out-group member, the personal content of the message is relevant to 
participants to the extent that the threat is considered salient (Spears et al., 1997; Turner 
et al., 1987). However, previous researchers examining persuasion and group identity 
have not examined persuasion as a threat to in-group value. For instance, McGarty et al., 
(1994) chose road safety or alcohol abuse as persuasion topics, which did not contain 
either positive or negative evaluations of group members. Rather, in-groups were created
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by pre-assessing attitudes about the presentation topic beforehand. Thus, the in-group’s 
reaction to a persuasive message was manipulated based on the specific topic that was 
evaluated. Neither the message presented nor the formation of the in-groups in this 
experiment addressed personal value of an in-group. Because previous research has not 
directly addressed group value, we propose that threats to an in-group’s value represent a 
consistently salient message that may result in different positive and negative responses 
dependent upon to what degree the threat is applied to the group as a whole.
As with the source of the message, we would expect a similar interaction of 
central and peripheral processing and inclusion towards predicting positive and negative 
responses. When a message is presented that applies to the entire group, we expect the 
threat to invoke greater degrees of personal relevance, and as such more central 
processing is likely (Petty & Cacioppo, 1986). As a consequence, we would expect less 
overall degrees o f negative statements as the validity o f the threat message is specifically 
considered, and cognitive opportunity is present to deconstruct the validity o f the threat. 
When a message is presented to a group that only criticizes a few members, personal 
relevance is less likely, and as such peripheral methods of evaluation will be more likely. 
As such we would expect a greater amount o f negative statements to be present as 
peripheral processing increases.
To reiterate, as a result of these studies demonstrating the role of personal 
relevance in ELM, we would expect differences in how messages are evaluated 
positively or negatively as a function of the salience invoked by our manipulations, but 
we would also expect participants’ degrees of central and peripheral processing to 
individually contribute to positive and negative statements differentially due to our
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salience manipulations. In essence, positive and negative responses as a dependent 
variable should vary as a function of the type of threat we present. Individual degrees of 
central and peripheral processing in turn should help predict those positive or negative 
responses dependent upon the condition presented.
Within-Groiip Identity and Persuasion
Although the above hypotheses address the potential relationships between 
central and peripheral processing, salience, and positive and negative assessments of a 
threat message, they do not address the role of individual identity. Research would 
suggest that greater degrees of investment within the membership of a group would 
lessen the degree to which argument focused elaborations would occur. Individuals who 
maintain high levels of identity are not likely to examine or change their attitudes 
regarding out-group members’ messages. As explained by Branscombe et al., (1999) and 
Spears et al., (1999), high identifiers are more prone to exhibit in-group bias, and low 
identifiers are only prone to in-group bias if it furthers group goals or status 
improvement. As such, those who highly identify with a group are more likely to engage 
in peripheral processing, as the invested identity within the group would make highly 
identified participants to be less likely to carefully evaluate a message from an out-group 
member, or distinguish a threat towards a few members versus the entire group. The 
subsequent expectation from this research is that in general, identity will not only be 
positively associated to negative statements within a threat scenario, but also be 
positively related with peripheral processing.
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Identity and Focus on the In-Group
To examine our final two questions, we first have to address the relationship 
between the processing of a counter-attitudinal threat message and the potential attitude 
change that can occur from that processing. Because previous research has not addressed 
persuasion as a threat to group value, how attitude change is assessed within persuasion 
literature must also be examined in the context of threat to group value. However, when 
persuasion and attitude change are examined in the context of group dynamics and threat, 
another simple component of group interchange likely affects how participants process a 
threat message. Salience between an in-group and an out-group represents a focus on 
the differences between the two groups (Turner et al., 1987). Following these basic 
premises, salience between these two groups represents a contrast that creates bias 
because the out-group is perceived as different from the in-group. In order for bias to be 
attributed to the out-group, participants must focus their cognitive elaborations towards 
the out-group and not the in-group. In other words, it seems likely that elaboration of the 
threat message will involve a focus upon the negative qualities of the out-group and not 
the validity of the message towards reducing positive views of the in-group.
Thus, the focus of a participant’s cognitive elaborations on either the in-group or 
out-group might produce different degrees of attitude change, regardless of the amount of 
central or peripheral processing. We propose that the greater the salience o f contrast 
between two groups, the greater the in-group’s s elaboration will focus on the out-group. 
Conversely, less salient contrast between two groups suggests in-group elaboration will 
focus on defending the in-group. Because conditions of threat maximize salience, they 
induce a separation between an in-group and an out-group. The cognitive elaboration
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necessary to defend the in-group’s value results in a focus of the validity of the out­
group’s position and arguments. Conversely, if salience between groups is less, then the 
validity of an argument is not addressed purely on the basis of it coming from an out­
group. As a result, individuals may attempt to address threat by examining conditions 
within their own group. We would expect that the overall ratings attributed to a threat 
message would differ based in part as a function of predominantly in-group or out-group 
focused elaborations. To the extent that participants see less of a contrast between the 
presenter o f a threat message and themselves, or to the extent that the message is 
considered personally relevant, it is more likely that the individual will apply the 
statements to his or her own group and elaborate upon them. Thus, less overall salience 
may result in greater amounts o f group-focused statements in contrast to high salience 
conditions where the participant is defending the well being o f the group from the 
outsider.
Similarly, salience is also determined by the degree to which participants identify 
with a particular group (Branscombe et al., 1999; Spears et al., 1999). Because high 
identifiers are expected to treat threat as relevant (e.g., Doosje et al., 2002), regardless of 
the source of the message, it seems likely that high identifiers will be more likely to 
automatically focus on the out-group. Consider that an individual who is highly invested 
in a particular organization and deriving purpose and meaning from that group, would be 
unlikely to examine potential flaws and shortcomings within a particular group. As such, 
we would expect greater degrees o f identity to be associated with greater amounts o f out­
group focused elaborations in order to minimize the degree to which participants are 
willing to review a threat message about their own group.
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As a function of potential differences in in-group focused elaborations due to the 
amount of salient contrast evoked, it also seems likely that in-group focused elaborations 
are directly or indirectly associated with the amount of participants’ positive and negative 
responses. Consider that greater salient threat conditions will minimize the motivation to 
review a naive theory by promoting cognitive elaboration towards the out group and not 
the in group. Likewise, because low inclusion threats are expected to evoke less salience 
compared to high-inclusion threats we would expect greater amounts of in-group focused 
elaborations. As such, it seems likely that when salience is high, out-group elaboration is 
more likely, resulting in negative statements. Borrowing from the research of Mackie et 
al., (1990) and McGarty et al., (1994), our manipulations of source and inclusion, 
partially due to variation in-group focused elaboration, will invoke differing degrees of 
positive and negative statements. Specifically, out-group elaborations should be more 
significantly associated with negative responses in out-group messages compared to in­
group messages and high inclusion manipulations compared to low inclusion 
manipulations.
In summation, the above discussion of persuasion proposes two broad influences 
towards the evaluation of IRT threat messages. First, we expect individual effects of 
identity, central and peripheral processing, and elaboration focus to significantly 
contribute to positive or negative evaluations of threat messages. Subsequently, we 
propose that the conditions of inclusion and source of the message will potentially alter 
these relationships, due to differing degrees of salient contrast that they evoke.
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The Removal of Salient Identity Threat and the Perseverance of Belief
The previous section examining attitude change represents a global test of belief 
perseverance applied to identity, only in reverse. More specifically, attitude change 
about a group’s value when an individual has previous investment in a group is the 
opposite of belief perseverance. In the previous section we propose that attitude change 
was a function of the focus of elaborations about a threat. Because salience represents a 
focus between in-group/out-group comparison, we expect that the degree of salience 
elicited by a threat may invoke a different focus on elaborations. Highly salient 
situations will result in a positive increase in perceived group value due to a focus of 
elaborating about the out-group, and not the defense of the in-group’s merits.
Conversely, lower degrees of salience will illicit an evaluation of the validity of the 
argument that might in turn lower a participant’s perception of group value.
Our final section removes itself from the specific predictions of bias and 
persuasion and asks a more general question: once conditions that promote inter-group 
comparison and conflict are invalidated, will previous attitudes about in-group value and 
bias towards the out-group persevere? It is important to note that the current question is 
independent o f other hypotheses presented in the current study. Although the 
manipulations of investment, source, and identity are potentially interesting exploratory 
questions, attitude change as a result o f threat can be examined in terms of whether or not 
it persists after the initial information has been recanted. Thus, in contrast to the creation 
of a single naive belief in the laboratory, our question about belief perseverance is 
whether a complex threat situation and resultant attitudes that occur can be nullified by 
recanting the information that initially started the conflict.
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Early research in belief perseverance demonstrated a tendency for people to 
persevere in beliefs that were created within the laboratory. For instance, Ross, Lepper, 
and Hubbard (1975) demonstrated that individuals persisted in their belief about their 
ability to judge actual suicide notes from fake ones, even after being informed that their 
initial assessment of their ability was random and inaccurate. Likewise, Anderson, 
Lepper, & Ross (1980) demonstrated that a created association between risk-taking and 
success as a fire-fighter persisted after disconfirming information. Subsequent studies 
have applied belief perseverance to more realistic settings and demonstrated similar 
findings. For instance, Jennings, Lepper, and Ross (1981) showed that perceived success 
or failure in persuading a confederate to donate blood persisted even after discredited.
These studies demonstrate a tendency to persevere with specific beliefs and more 
complex value related beliefs such as persuasive ability (e.g., Jennings et al., 1981); 
however, their applicability towards broader belief systems that represent personal 
investment over time has been mostly assumed rather than tested (i.e., Anderson, 1995b). 
Applied to a threat situation defined within an SIT or SCT identity context, we propose a 
tentative explanation for how attitudes resulting from in-group/out-group threat might 
persevere. Our interpretation is dependent upon crucial and often repeated assumptions 
of SCT in the current manuscript. In-group bias is a function of salience that is 
established within a situational basis (Turner et al., 1987). As salience represents the 
mechanism that establishes attitudes towards the out-group, invalidating the situation and 
the message might result in a new situation where group identity is no longer salient, and 
thus, previous attitudes and judgments no longer apply. Thus, the question posed is
40
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whether or not differing degrees of threat “salience” as represented by our inclusion and 
source variables will mediate the degree of bias or value maintained.
Belief perseverance research shows that belief perseverance can be negated, 
depending on several factors. For instance, Anderson (1983) showed that perseverance 
can be mediated by individuals creating causal scenarios of why their current belief is 
correct. Likewise, if a debriefing explains the tendency for belief perseverance, 
laboratory created beliefs can be negated (Ross et al., 1975). These findings suggest that 
participants must either elaborate on the new information or be made aware of a tendency 
to persist in beliefs in order to revise previous information (see also Anderson & Sechler,
1986). In addition, the nature of the belief being examined also affects belief 
perseverance. The perceived value of an in-group is a pre-existing belief that contributes 
to one’s self-worth. Logically, previously held beliefs that are personally relevant are 
maintained more tenaciously than beliefs that are not as personally relevant. Research by 
Anderson (1995a) showed that previously held implicit personality theories biased 
subsequent judgments on non-congruent trait pairs (e.g., politeness related to lying). This 
finding is in some ways replicated with invested groups by Batson (1975) who not only 
demonstrated persistence of religious beliefs in the face of discontinuing information, but 
also showed a subsequent increase in these beliefs.
The result o f these findings suggests that within the current context o f threat, 
negative attitudes about the out-group will persist even after the validity o f the threat is 
demonstrated to be fictitious. However, we propose a tentative caveat involving belief 
perseverance that may be relevant within identity threat conditions. Following research 
by Batson (1975), who found that in some cases discrediting beliefs would actually
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intensify the beliefs being discredited, we would expect increased beliefs about in-group 
value as well as negative perceptions of the out-group to persist despite discrediting 
information about the threat. As with our discussion of attitude change, we expect this is 
a function of elaboration based on the out-group due to salient contrast. Although it 
would be considered beneficial for participants to maintain their beliefs about the 
superiority of their in-group, it would not be beneficial for participants to ignore the 
nullification of threat if their perception of the value of the in-group has lessened. For 
those participants who have perceived the threat as valid and have subsequently reduced 
their perceptions of the value of the in-group, nullification of the threat would be 
considered excellent motivation to change their negative assessment of their own group. 
Thus, based on Anderson and Lindsay's (1998) components o f time, resources, and 
motivation that are necessary to review a naive theory, we might expect any negative 
change in the perceived value o f a group to revert to pre-threat levels once the threat has 
been negated
Summation, of Premises. Exploratory Hypotheses and Predictive Hypotheses
The current study seeks to apply social identity theory (Tajfel & Turner, 1979) 
and self-categorization theory (Turner et al., 1987) to immediate and relevant threat 
(IRT) scenarios. An examination of three variables that determine salience are used to 
examine specific outcomes of conflict. These independent variables are identity, the 
source of a message as either an in-group or out-group, and the inclusion of the message 
as either applying to a few or all of a target groups’ members. We apply these 
manipulations to three principal variables of conflict, namely, in-group bias, persuasion, 
and the persistence of in-group bias and value. In addition, we explore the possibility
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that pre-existing group membership of specific ideologies may differentially contribute to 
our dependent variables of interest. A summary list of expectations is provided below.
In-Group Bias:
HI. In-group manipulations will produce less bias than out-group 
manipulations.
H2. Low inclusion manipulations will produce less bias than high inclusion 
manipulations.
H3. An interaction o f identity and manipulation conditions will occur where 
individuals who have low identity will show differentiation between 
manipulation conditions, but high-identifiers will remain consistently and 
highly biased regardless o f manipulations.
Persuasion:
Central and Peripheral Processing:
H4. Central processing will be inversely related to participants ’ negative 
statements in IRT conditions.
H5. Out-group manipulations will produce more negative statements than in­
group manipulations.
H6. Low inclusion manipulations will produce greater amounts o f negative 
statements compared to high-inclusion statements.
H7. Identity will be positively associated with both the amount o f negative
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H8. In-group focused elaborations will be inversely associated with negative 
statements.
H9. Low inclusion and in-group manipulations will contain greater amounts o f 
in-group focused elaborations compared to higher salience invoking 
manipulations o f high inclusion or out-group manipulations.
H10. Identity will be inversely associated with in-group focused elaboration.
HU. Group-focused statements will predict greater amounts o f negative
statements in high inclusion, out-group manipulations, and less amounts o f 
negative statements in low inclusion in-group manipulations.
Persistence of Bias and Belief:
HI 2. Bias will persist after the validity o f the threat is demonstrated to be 
fictitious.
HI 3. A negative change in the perceived value o f a group will not persist after 
the validity o f the threat is demonstrated to be fictitious.
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In order to accurately examine the role of conflict and in-group bias with pre­
existing groups, several potential confounds and considerations need to be taken into 
account. The general design of this study employed a 2 (in-group source, out-group 
source) X 2 (low threat inclusion, high threat inclusion) design, with ratings of identity 
and other variables as predictors of the dependent variable. However, in order to both 
control for and examine differences between individuals within groups and overall group 
effects, hierarchical linear modeling (HLM; Bryk & Raudenbush, 1992) was employed as 
the dominant means of analysis. A more detailed description of the HLM process is 
described in the Results section.
Participants
Student organizations were recruited from four college campuses, including 
three public universities in the Midwest, and one Northeastern mid-sized university, 
representing a total of 12 groups. O f these 12 groups, 4 general group types were 
assessed including fraternities, sororities, Christian religious groups, and political or 
ideological cause groups. Participant sizes for these groups ranged from 5 to 49 (M= 15; 
SD = 12.86). Each of the four groups within one particular group type received one of 
the two by two manipulations of source (in-group, out-group) and inclusion (low, high).
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Procedure
Several procedural steps were used to recruit student organizations. Across four 
universities a list of student organizations were selected based on their mission 
statements. Groups that espoused a specific cause, regardless of the particulars of that 
cause, were selected for contact. Student leaders of these organizations were contacted to 
discuss the full purpose and nature of the study and their group’s potential participation, 
emphasizing the temporary deception necessary to effectively conduct the study. Student 
leaders who agreed to participate served as confederates by announcing that someone 
was coming to speak with their organization with a representative from the university. 
Additionally, we insisted that the group leader not provide any additional information 
about the meeting, feigning ignorance if necessary, about why a person was coming to 
speak with them.
All experimental sessions were conducted at the regular meeting place and 
meeting time of a particular organization. At the appointed time, the student leader 
announced the principal investigator’s name and informed the organization that he and 
another person were going to speak with them. For all sessions, the principal investigator 
was accompanied by a confederate who served as a “representative” from another student 
organization, and one or two research assistants. The principal investigator informed the 
organization that he was a representative from the university examining an “experimental 
new communication technique” by bringing a representative from another student 
organization to speak with them. The principal investigator then began a two- stage 
consent process in order to ensure voluntary participation on the part of participants. In 
the first stage the PI explained that this communication technique involved the use of
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surveys, participation was voluntary, and participants were to carefully read the consent 
forms distributed, and should they agree, sign the form. Participants were also informed 
during this first stage that they would all be given a second opportunity to choose to 
participate after a full explanation of the procedure was given. In stage two, participants 
were informed that the PI was examining a new communication technique that allowed 
groups to freely express their thoughts and feelings when they had complaints about 
another student organization. The PI then explained that the actor confederate 
represented a student organization that for purposes of the procedure will remain 
anonymous so that they could express themselves without fear of their affiliation 
influencing the participant’s organization. Participants were told that surveys would be 
used so that participants within the target organization could express their feelings 
without fear of peer influence. They were then given the opportunity to withdraw their 
participation and leave the room.
Participants were then instructed to complete a packet of pre-assessment 
measures (See Appendix C) and informed that the anonymous group representative will 
present his or her concerns after these packets are completed (See Appendix B). 
Manipulation 1
During the process of explaining the procedure, our “representative speaker” was 
introduced as either representing members of another student organization that has very 
different ideas and goals as the target group (out-group) or a student organization that 
shares similar goals and ideals (in-group). This explanation served as the principal 
manipulation with regards to out-group or in-group source.
Independent and Covariate Measures
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Several initial measures and one-item questions were provided for participants to 
complete before, during, and after the “representative” presented his or her message. 
These measures either served as subject level predictors of group manipulations, or as 
covariates. For each measure, an indication of its use is explained for particular models 
in subsequent analyses.
Identity: (Luhtanen & Crocker. 1992). The measure used for identity represents a 
sub-scale of the Collective Self Esteem (CSE) scale. The CSE is a 16-item measure 
designed to assess several components of self esteem derived from group identity. Of 
primary interest to the current study is the four-item sub-scale that measures the degree of 
self concept gained from group membership (e.g., “The social groups I belong to are an 
important reflection of who I am.”). Each item contains likert style responses anchored 
at 1 {strongly disagree) and 7 {strongly agree). Subscale scores were calculated by 
taking the average of each subscale after reversals. A high score on the identity subscale 
indicates a greater degree of identity derived from a group. Reliability (a) for this sub­
scale was .71
Individual Group Affiliation. In order to control for and possibly account for 
differences in the dependent variables due to differing group ideologies or types, a series 
of within-manipulation t-tests were conducted (e.g., do religious groups consistently 
differ from sororities in all four conditions?). If differences between group scores were 
consistent across manipulation types and if differences were fully crossed across the 
model, a dummy code (0,1) was placed in the group level analysis. Please note that these 
codes were test driven in that codes were created due to significant differences, rather 
than the group type itself. Thus, it can be the case where groups assigned to a specific
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code may represent all four group types because these groups specifically differ from 
other groups across the manipulations. Full details involving this process are described in 
the Results section.
Perception of Value Change. Perceived value of belonging to a group was 
assessed by asking one question anchored at 1 {not at all) and 13 {completely) in the pre, 
middle, and post sections of the assessment. The question asks, “To what extent do other 
members of this group behave in such a way that promotes the “positive image” of your 
group?” This repeated question assessed the degree that participants believe that they are 
associating with a group that is altruistic or positive. Difference measures were created 
by subtracting each participant’s response after the manipulation statement from the 
participant’s pre-manipulation response. Thus, a negative score represents a participant’s 
reduction in perceived value of the group, whereas a positive score represents an increase 
in the perception of value in the group. This process is repeated by subtracting the post­
assessment of this item from the manipulation assessment of value, creating a post value 
change score to examine after the participants had been informed of the untrue nature of 
the “representative’s” statement. Again, negative scores represent further reduction in 
perceived value, whereas positive scores represent an increase in perceived group value. 
Manipulation 2
After completion of pre-assessment measures, participants were informed that the 
“representative speaker” will now present his or her statement and that following the 
speaker’s statement, participants should complete section B of the survey packet (See 
Appendix C). Participants were told that these packets give them the opportunity to 
respond to our “anonymous group’s concerns”. Our confederate then recited one of four
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carefully composed scripts that differ in the degree of threat inclusion and provided 
secondary reinforcement of the source (i.e., in-group or out-group member) of the 
representative speaker (See Appendix B for all four statements).
Composition of these scripts was assessed by several senior psychology students, 
some of whom were members of student organizations of interest. After several 
alterations, this focus group concluded that the statements represent a realistic and hostile 
criticism of another organization, but was general enough to apply to groups with 
different ideologies. To ensure that the presentation of the messages was as consistent as 
possible, confederates represented undergraduate students with previous acting 
experience who spent several hours rehearsing the manipulation scripts. Every attempt 
was made to ensure that confederates presented the script and its contents with a similar 
degree of upset, vocal tone, and non-verbal behavior.
The content of these scripts were identical with the exception of the extent to 
which they accused the entire group of inappropriate behaviors, close-mindedness, and 
elitism (high-inclusion), or only accused a few members of the group of these traits (low 
inclusion). Furthermore, during sessions where the confederate represented a group that 
was similar to die participant’s organization, participants recited one initial sentence: 
“First of all, I would like to say that I am (a) xxxx like the rest of you.” For example, 
when presenting the message to a fraternity, the confederate would state that he is a 
member of a fraternity like the rest of the participants. These statements served as a 
reminder to participants that the representative belonged to a similar group and represents 
the secondary reinforcement of source in our manipulation procedure.
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However, it should be noted that the gender of our confederate speaker was not 
random due to the nature of the groups being assessed. For instance, it was not viable to 
present a female confederate as an in-group speaker to a fraternity or a male as an in­
group speaker to a sorority. Although this presents a potential confound of gender with 
source of the message, this confound is addressed in several ways. Most importantly, 
gender should not theoretically override group membership salience in this type of 
experiment. Turner et al. (1987) suggests that more inclusive groups override broader 
contrast groups such as age or gender. Indeed, differences in bias due to gender in some 
ways represent a subordinate part of a particular group’s overall ideology towards other 
groups. However, certain precautions and preliminary analyses were employed to 
examine any potential effect that gender had towards contributing to results. These 
precautions are described in subsequent sections.
After completion of the statement by the confederate, participants were instructed 
to hold their questions or concerns and complete section B where there is an opportunity 
to write their responses to the statement after completing the required measures described 
below.
In-group bias: Jackson and Smith (19991 and Luhtanen and Crocker (19921. 
Semantic differential scales were employed in the pre-manipulation, manipulation, and 
post-manipulation phases of the experiment. Several polar adjectives (inferior/superior, 
uncreati ve/creative, unhelpful/helpful, unfriendly/friendly, uncooperative/cooperative, 
ignorant/knowledgeable, close-minded/open-minded, unjust/just, incorrect views/correct 
views) were rated on 13 point scales anchored at +6 (positive adjective) to -6 (negative 
adjective). In the pre-manipulation phase, participants rated their own group, and the
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confederate actor who presented the manipulation message. During the manipulation 
phase, individuals again rated the speaker on these adjectives. Finally, these scales were 
completed again after being informed that the message was fictitious. Reliability (a) for 
these semantic differential items was greater than .90 for all scales.
Two scores o f bias were obtained in the present study representing a change in 
bias after the manipulation, as well as the degree of bias that remained after participants 
were informed that the statement provided to them was untrue. Manipulation-bias was 
created by subtracting participants’ ratings of their own group from ratings of the speaker 
after he or she had presented the message. Summed positive scores from these adjectives 
indicate that the spokesperson is viewed as having greater degrees of positive qualities 
when compared to the participant’s group. Negative scores from these adjectives 
indicate that the spokesperson has less positive qualities compared to the participant’s 
group, indicating in-group bias.
Residual-bias was determined by subtracting our final measurement of bias from 
manipulation bias. This score represents a shift in bias from the manipulation stage to the 
post stage of the experiment. This variable was used to examine bias persistence after the 
nature of the statement as false had been disclosed. Summed positive scores from these 
adjectives indicate that the spokesperson is viewed as having greater degrees of positive 
qualities when compared to the participant’s group. Again, negative scores from these 
adjectives indicate that the spokesperson has less positive qualities compared to the 
participant’s group, indicating in-group bias.
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Content Coding Involving the Examination of Central and Peripheral Processing. 
Positive and Negative Statements, and In-group and Out-group Elaboration Focus of 
Threat Messages. In order to examine how participants responded to threat messages, 
they were given the following instructions: “Please list any and all comments or thoughts 
that you had while listening to the speaker’s statements. Please feel free to include any 
comments about anything related to what the speaker said in the speech, the speaker and 
the speaker’s personality, the topic of the speech, the context in which the speaker spoke, 
or anything else you might have been thinking about during message presentation, 
including totally unrelated things” (Mackie et al., 1990, p. 814). Using a coding scheme 
provided by the same authors, statements were coded in different ways. First, raters 
assessed the number of sentence statements made on the argument presented by the 
speaker (A) or personal characteristics of the speaker (S) as an example of predominantly 
peripheral or central processing. In order to assess the focus of elaborative statements, 
statements were analyzed as to whether they refer to the in-group (I) or out-group (O). In 
this manner the responses of participants were examined in terms of whether the defense 
of the in-group represents a focus on the group to which the participant belongs or a 
focus on the speaker presenting the message. Third, in order to examine the positive or 
negative content o f the response message, sentences were coded as either positive (+), 
negative (-), or neutral (N).
Measures of these three ratings were created by summing the number of 
argument focused statements, in-group focused statements, and negative statements and 
then dividing each participant’s score by the total number of statements made. Thus, 
three variables, Argument%, Group% and Negative% represent the respective percentage
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of these components in a participant’s response. Greater percentages of any of these 
variables represent an overall greater percentage of that component within the overall 
response. Note that in the case of Argument% and Group%, the remaining percentage not 
accounted for by these variables represents respectively, peripheral statements% and 
statements focused on the speaker or the speaker’s anonymous group.
Post Assessment and Debriefing
Upon completion of the manipulation packet, participants were informed that 
this procedure was fictitious and that our speaker did not represent any actual student 
group. Before explaining the full purpose of the experiment, participants were given a 
short closing packet that contained all of the dependent measures with the exception of 
the open-ended responses, in order to rate their perceptions of the individual after they 
were informed that the information presented was not accurate and fictitious (See 
Appendix C for specific scales). Upon completion of this packet, participants were 
informed of the actual purpose of the study (See Appendix B for procedural script). An 
extended discussion followed where the principal investigators address any potential 
negative feelings that had arisen as well as the usefulness of the experiment for 
individuals and the group to which they belonged. Discussion topics included previous 
findings in persuasion and conflict and how the experimental experience, as well as these 
findings, could serve as useful tools in potential future conflicts. The experimental 
session did not end until participants indicated that they were aware of the true aims of 
the experiment and demonstrated positive affect in their behaviors (e.g., smiles, 
laughing). Finally, participants were asked not to disclose the nature of the experiment to 
others for the remaining period of assessment. Subsequent contact with group leaders,
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approximately two to three weeks after assessment, did not indicate any specific 
incidents of resentment, anger, or emotional perturbation from themselves or their group 
members.
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CHAPTER III
RESULTS
Overview and Hierarchical Linear Model Design
HLM is a method of analysis that examines nested data in tiers, or levels (Nezlek 
& Zyzniewski, 1998). In general, HLM analyzes data based on two (or more) levels 
where each subsequent level depends on the outcome of the previous level with regards 
to its particular effect. HLM has been used in the social sciences to examine student and 
classroom behavior, (Bryk & Raudenbush, 1992), dyadic pair behavior (Cronin, 1994; 
Nezlek, 2001) and is well known for its use in longitudinal studies (O’Connor, 2004). 
Unlike ordinary least squares estimates of data (e.g., ANOVA), HLM employs an 
iterative method based on maximum likelihood estimates (MLE; Bryk & Raudenbush, 
1992), which in essence, fits probability distributions to data. Thus, similar to other 
iterative techniques such as structural equation modeling, HLM presents models of 
results that are designed to fit the data.
There are several benefits to using HLM, particularly within the current analysis. 
First, unlike OLS techniques, HLM relaxes the independence assumption between 
subjects. Whenever data is collected within any sort of group, or is not collected 
individually, certain environmental constants, such as temperature, group membership, or 
general atmosphere may create an interdependent effect within a particular group. As a 
result, most authors recommend the use of group level as the focus for these types of
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analyses (see Silverman & Solmon, 1998). Second, group level analysis alone does not 
address the variability and individual level response of the participants. Likewise, it does 
not provide for unique contributions to the data due to individual response. This 
distinction between subject and group effects is particularly relevant to social identity. 
Social identity is conceived as a subject level variable that is affected by the norms of 
one’s group (Ellemers, Spears, & Doosje, 1997; Tajfel & Turner, 1979; Turner et al.,
1987). HLM accounts for both subject and group levels of analysis by making group 
level analysis dependent upon subjects within the group. Each group represents an 
individual regression slope that is created by the subjects within the group. Each of these 
slopes is then weighted with regards to its reliability, which is a function of the group’s 
sample size as well as how much subject level data is responsible for genuine variance of 
the outcome variable. In addition, HLM provides estimates of variability for both subject 
and group levels of analysis, thus allowing for an accurate examination of where the 
majority of variation occurs.
When using HLM to specify a model based on observations, several issues of fit 
and design should be addressed. In regards to the latter, the current study employed a 
two-level model where individual subjects within groups were represented at Level 1 and 
group outcomes due to the 2 X 2  manipulation of source and inclusion were represented 
at Level 2. This general 2-Level model was employed for each relevant dependent 
variable of interest. However, models must further be specified due to a variety of 
theoretical possibilities that best fit the data. In this particular case, although Level 2 
variables are non-random manipulations of the group in question, predictor variables at 
Level 1 are specified as random. As such, a series of tests are traditionally performed to
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determine (a) the amount of unpredicted group and subject level variation within the 
dependent variable, (b) the amount of variation accounted for by subject level predictors 
alone, and (c) the amount of variation accounted for by subject and group level variables.
The issue of fit in this case is tested by a series of models in which Level 1 
variables are set as random, examined, and the models are compared in terms of a 
significant increase or decrease of overall fit. Thus, for each outcome dependent 
variable, methodology used from Bryk and Raudenbush (1992) was employed that 
represents a series of three models that determine the best fit for the variability of the 
data. As variability may be constant for one outcome variable and a particular predictor, 
but not another variable, these models were employed for each dependent variable of 
interest. Essentially, three models, the Unspecified Model, Slopes as Outcomes Model, 
and Means and Slopes as Outcomes models were examined for each principal analysis.
The Unspecified Model is the equivalent of a one-way ANOVA with random 
effects where Level 1 is denoted as:
1 . 1  [ Yij= Poy + r ij ]
The outcome of any particular participant’s Y,7 is a function of po j  (the intercept 
or mean outcome of /  groups) and r,-y, which is the error term representing an unique 
effect of the individual subject. The Level 2 model is denoted as:
1-2 [ Poy =  Yo o +  go7]
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For this equation, Poy is calculated by the effect of yo o representing the grand 
mean between groups, and goy is the random effect between these groups. An 
examination of a model specified in this manner does not test specific predictors or 
hypotheses. Rather, it provides an estimation of within and between variation, 
demonstrating where the majority of variation occurs. As an example, use of these 
equations for the outcome variable of in-group bias would demonstrate the amount of 
bias variability that resides at the subject level, as well as the amount of bias variation 
that resides between groups.
The Slopes as Outcomes Model represents a general model where individual 
predictors are placed within the Level 1 model, but manipulations as represented by 
inclusion and source are excluded. This model provides a general relationship between 
the Level 1 predictors and the Level 2 outcome or dependent variable. For this model, 
the Level 2 model is the same as before:
2.1 [Po/ = yoo + Mo./]
The Level 1 model, however, is altered to include one or more Level 1 predictors.
2.2 t f 7= p 0;  + p i,(X l7-X .;)  + r /y]
In this equation, Poy remains as the intercept, and Piy (X,7 -  X . J) represents the 
inclusion of a predictor term that is multiplied by the difference of individual scores 
within a group minus the group mean. In essence, this model allows for the Level 1
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prediction of Level 2 outcome variables without the context of Level 2 group 
manipulations. Note that multiple predictors can be placed in this model with the 
addition of P.;y prediction variables. Using our previous example, piy would represent 
individual participants’ identity scores towards the prediction of in-group bias without 
the effect of either inclusion or source manipulations at Level 2.
Finally, the Means and Slopes as Outcomes model examines both the intercepts 
of the model as well as the slopes for each group. Level 1 data is represented in the same 
way as equation 2.2:
3-1 [^7 =Poy +  Piy(X,7 - X . y )  + r 7]
However, including Level 2 predictors creates two separate equations for each Pij 
predictor representing the individual contributions of slopes within groups, as well as 
mean variation. Thus for the Level 1 example, two Level 2 equations are presented:
3.2 [Poj  = Yo o + Yo i W/ +poj\
3.3 [Pij  = Yi o + Yi l W / + p i y]
In equation 3.2 the intercept, Poy, is a function of yo o, which represents the grand 
mean for any outcome variable and yo i , which represents the difference in means of W y, 
a nominal indicator variable. The last term, poy represents the unique effect of a particular 
group while holding Wy constant. In equation 3.3 the predictor variable, Piy, is the
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function of y i o, which represents the average slope of the predictor variable and y i i , 
which is the mean difference of slopes between the indicator variable W Finally, 
represents the unique effect of a particular group on the slope of the predictor variable 
while holding W y constant.
In equations 3.2 and 3.3 above, only one indicator variable is placed at Level 2. 
However, in the majority of analyses that follow, two Level 2 indicators are placed 
representing the effects of inclusion and source. Substituting these titles for the W /s, a 
general model for subsequent HLM analyses is constructed in equations 4.1,4.2, and 4.3.
4.1 [(D. V) = p0j  + Piy (Predictor Variable) + r ,y ]
4.2 [po y = yo o +  Yo l (Inclusion) + y0 2 (Source) +poy]
4.3 [Piy = yi 0 + Yi 1 (Inclusion) + yi 2 (Source)+piy]
The selection of the model that best fits the data involves comparison of the 
deviance statistic between models. The significant increase or decrease in fit is 
determined by a x2 distribution. These comparison models will be compared to the 
overall hypothesized models to determine overall fit. In order to save space, only the 
distribution of variance presented in percentages will be stated for the Unspecified Model 
in order to give readers basic information about where variance is distributed in the 
model. Similarly, only deviance statistics, as well as inclusion or removal from a model
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will be reported, whereas the best fitting model will be defined in detail within each 
section.
Finally, some measures will consistently serve as variables across all of the 
analyses. At Level 1, the personal identity sub-scale of the CSE will serve as a predictor 
of Level 2 variables representing identity invested in the group. In addition, dummy 
codes representing an individual’s group affiliation will be placed (if applicable) in order 
to detect and control for any individual effects due to group affiliation. As with most 
model programs, effect codes that do not show significant differences will be removed 
from the model to conserve Level 1 degrees of freedom. At Level 2, inclusion of the 
threat and source of the threat as an in-group or out-group member represent our 
manipulations, but each model is tested for the viability of an Inclusion X Source 
interaction term to be placed within the Level 2 model. In cases where fit is significantly 
improved and the interaction term is significant, this term is placed in the Level 2 model. 
In cases where these conditions are not met, the term is excluded.
Mean Differences and General Slope Prediction; Effects of Group Mean Centering
Note that the majority o f predictive Level 1 (or subject) variables are group mean 
centered. This centering method subtracts the mean of an individual subject within a 
group from die group mean (e.g. [scorey -  groupscore.j]) for each group. The result of 
this centering method results in the intercept representing the mean of each group in a 
regression equation. These means are then effectively ignored creating an overall metric 
where 0 represents the average score within all groups, and positive and negative scores 
represent deviations of the predictor from that average (Bryk & Raudenbush, 1992).
62
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
Practical interpretation of a variable that has been group mean centered provides 
an “average” slope, demonstrating the relationship of the predictor to the dependent 
variable regardless of where the mean score for a particular group might reside. Thus, Y 
in the regression equation becomes a general variable where for any mean value of Y, the 
regression equation provides a general prediction of how the predictor variable in 
question is associated with Y. This method of interpretation is useful for this type of 
analysis where pre-existing groups may exhibit differing mean degrees of a particular 
predictor variable due to pre-existing conflicts or inherent politics inherent to the target 
group. Thus, results and figures provided for predictor variables represent the average 
slope of a predictor variable regardless o f its mean differences.
Mean differences are represented by yo. analyses, demonstrating how between 
variation of the dependent variable due to the manipulations created differences in the 
variable in question. An examination of these two analyses involving mean differences 
and average slopes of predictors demonstrate mean variation due to the manipulations, 
and how, on average, the predictor variables behave towards explaining the mean 
differences across groups.
Environmental. Contextual, and Manipulation Checks 
Although HLM is designed to account for within group commonalities due to 
environment, it does not specifically address what these sources represent. Because the 
nature of this study involves an environmental examination of pre-existing groups that is 
not conducted within a laboratory, potential confounds are examined due to the design of 
the study as well as the overall perceptions of participants of their group and the threat 
scenario. This is important for three reasons. First, because of the nature of the design,
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some components such as gender of the confederate could not be held constant. To that 
extent, it is worthwhile to examine if any differences did exist that are subsequently 
controlled for by using HLM. Second, relevant data that defines how participants 
perceived their group within the experimental experience helps to define an 
environmental context by which these results can be compared to relevant “real-life” 
group conflict scenarios. Similarly, it also helps to define what type of group (e.g., a 
positively viewed group versus a less esteemed group) to which these findings are most 
likely to apply. Third, because studies have not undertaken social identity research of 
this nature, data regarding participants’ perceptions helps to further place and connect the 
current findings with a well-established previous body of literature.
Overall Believabilitv
Belief was assessed by two principal sources. First participants who responded 
negatively to “Before we told you that the representative presented fictitious information, 
did you believe that his/her statement came from another student organization?” were 
removed from the sample. Second, any participant whose written response indicated that 
the participant questioned the nature of the speaker as coming from an “anonymous 
student organization” was also removed from analysis. Overall 237 participants 
participated across 12 groups; however, 16 were removed because they were group 
leaders who were previously informed of the study. Of the remaining 221 subjects, 180 
represented subjects who “believed”, demonstrating an 81% overall belief rate across 
groups. Thus, all analyses regarding hypotheses, manipulation checks, or descriptive 
data, represent participants who believed in the experimental scenario.
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Potential Differences in Bias and Persuasion due to Actor Gender
Some categories of groups necessitated a particular gender to perform as either 
an in-group or out-group member. For instance, a male confederate speaker could not 
perceived as an in-group member of a sorority. In order to examine potential differences 
due to the gender of the confederate actor, several t-tests were conducted with the initial 
rating of the speaker. These ratings were analyzed because they are only influenced by 
the first manipulation of the source of the message by presenting the speaker as a 
representative from a group that is similar or different from the participant’s 
organization. As a result, the inclusion condition can be collapsed with regards to these 
analyses. Secondly, and more importantly, these ratings represent first impressions of the 
speaker which may be more likely to detect inherent gender bias without the influence of 
other manipulations that are created later in the scenario.
However, gender was not fidly crossed with the model because opposite sex 
confederates with fraternities and sororities would invalidate specific cells (e.g., a female 
claiming to be a fraternity member). Therefore, specific subsets of the sample had to be 
compared to examine potential bias differences due to gender o f the actor. A split file t- 
test analysis was conducted separating gender of the actor within in-group and out-group 
manipulations. In other words, within both in-group manipulation groups and out-group 
manipulation groups, initial male and female speaker ratings were compared for each 
gender receiving the message.
Results within the in-group manipulations indicate that female actors were rated 
equivalently by both men and women (Male = 6.9 versus Female = 7.3, /(l,39.9) = -1.31, 
p  = .19), but male actors were rated significantly better by female participants compared
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to males (Female = 8.8 versus Male = 7.2 ; t{1,32) = -2.60, p  = .01). Results for 
organizations provided with an out-group speaker could only be compared with female 
actors, as male actors were not available for these groups. Results indicate that men and 
women again rated female actors equivalently (Male = 7.35 versus Female = 7.18, t(l,75) 
-  .535, p  = .60).
In sum and with the analyses available, results do not indicate any influence due 
to what is typically considered sexist or misogynistic ideology that would result in female 
actors being rated more negatively by men compared to women. However, male actors 
were rated more positively by female participants. Because this specific finding with 
females actually contributes to a more conservative analysis, and because HLM accounts 
for differences in slopes across groups, gender was not controlled for in the model. 
Participant’s Perception of Group Membership and Message
The following perceptions represent participants’ beliefs about their organization 
as well as their sense of prototypicallity before the manipulation was presented, but after 
participants were fully informed that another organization had disapproved of them. 
Overall, participants reported that their beliefs and actions were very typical of the 
groups’ beliefs and actions (M= 9.33, SD = 2.29)
In contrast to relatively positive beliefs about group membership, participants’ 
ratings were negative for the presented message. Out of a possible positive score of 13, 
participants did not like any of our 4 manipulation messages (M -  2.73, SD -  2.32), and 
did not rate the content of the message as convincing (M= 3.75, SD = 3.05) or 
representing quality arguments (M= 4.47, SD = 2.95). In essence, participants accurately 
perceived that the message presented to them was not a well thought out argument, but
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rather represented an emotional presentation that blatantly accused the group of elitist 
behavior.
Perception of Source
Several questions were embedded in the survey to determine the perception, if 
any, of our manipulations. With regards to participants’ perception of the messenger as 
an in-group or out-group member, there was no significant difference between how 
similar participants perceived themselves to the in-group speaker compared to the out­
group speaker (5.88 versus 5.59, r(l,179) = .105,p  = .42). However, participants did 
report overall greater degrees of anger (8.0 versus 5.8, /( l,179) -  3.88 p  = .000) and 
emotional upset (8.9 versus 7.2, /(l, 179)= 3.12, p  = .002) in the in-group condition 
compared to the out-group condition. Similarly, participants demonstrated a trend 
towards liking the message less so from an in-group member (2.4 versus 3.0, r(l,179) = - 
1.77, p  = .09). Although the source manipulation did not seem to alter participants’ 
feelings of similarity towards die speaker, greater upset and less liking strongly suggest a 
“black sheep” effect. More specifically, the speaker’s perceived membership in a similar 
group resulted in feelings of betrayal, and subsequently worse ratings compared to an 
out-group member (Homsey & Imani, 2004).
Perception of Inclusion
Mean scores were calculated between groups where only a few members of a 
group (low inclusion) are accused versus the entire group (high inclusion) for the 
following survey question, “To what extent do you think that the speaker’s statements 
apply to everyone in your group?” Results showed that participants perceived the 
message as more applicable or likely when the threat applied to only a few members of
67
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
Preliminary Analyses: Identity and In-Group Focused Elaborations.
Our second series of preliminary analyses concerns any relationship between the 
identity of an individual participant towards a particular organization and the degree of 
in-group related statements made (H10). In order to examine the general relationship a 
Pearson correlation was performed. Results indicated no relationship between the 
variables (r = -.068 p  = .36). However, similar to our analysis with identity and argument 
statements, any potential correlational relationship could be confounded by differential 
association between identity and group focused statements due to the different conditions 
presented to participants across groups. Again, a 2-Level HLM model was employed to 
test this possibility, which more importantly, allows us to examine if in-group focused 
elaborations significantly differ due to manipulation conditions of source and inclusion 
(H9).
Preliminary Fit of HLM Model: Group-Focused Statements. Examination of an 
unspecified HLM model indicates an ICC (r) of .077 indicating that approximately 8% of 
variation for in-group focused statements resided between groups. The Muthen et al., 
(2006) statistic for sufficient between group variation yielded a score of 2.08, (> 2.00) 
indicating barely sufficient variation to use HLM in subsequent analyses. Reported 
deviance for the unspecified model was 70.27.
Inclusion of identity as a predictor in the model did not significantly reduce 
model deviation (70.27 versus 69.02, x2 (1,11) = 1.24,p  = .27). Inclusion of Level 2 
predictors similarly did not produce a significant reduction in deviance (69.02 versus 
67.43, x2 (4,8) = 1.58, p  > .50). Thus, neither the inclusion of identity nor the addition of
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inclusion and source significantly improved the fit of the HLM model. However, these 
terms were retained in the model to demonstrate general hypotheses.
Identity. Inclusion, and Source as Predictors of Group Focused Statements. In 
order to examine the potential effects of identity, inclusion, and source as mediators of 
group focused statements a two level HLM model was employed with identity as a 
subject level predictor, and inclusion and source as Level 2 predictors. Reliability for 
this model was .44, and approximately 92% of the between level variation and 7% of 
total model variation was explained with the addition of these predictors to the model. 
Both HLM and OLS results are reported in Table 6 .
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TABLE 6
HLM and OLS Estimates of Identity, Inclusion, and Source Towards Predicting Group Focused Statements
HLM
Fixed Effect Coefficient S.E.
OLS
/-ratio /7-value Coefficient S.E. /-ratio /7-value
LEVEL 2 Intercept PO
INTRCPT2, yOO 0.47 0.05 8.64 0.000 0.45 0.03 11.61 0.000
INCLUS, yOl -0.07 0.06 -1.21 0.258 -0.07 0.04 -1.66 0.098
SOURCE, y02 0.01 0.06 0.17 0.865 0.03 0.04 0.74 0.456
LEVEL 1 Identity pi
INTRCPT2, ylO -0.01 0.03 -0.30 0.764 -0.01 0.03 -0.29 0.771
INCLUS, y ll -0.00 0.03 -0.14 0.887 -0.00 0.03 -0.13 0.891
SOURCE, y!2 -0.01 0.03 -0.39 0.694 -0.01 0.03 -0.38 0.702
Final estimation of variance components: ^
00
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Regarding both main effects and identity as a subject level predictor, results did 
not indicate any significance regarding identity and group focused statements. As such, 
in-group focused statements did not significantly differ due to salience manipulations, 
and identity did not significantly predict group-focused statements. Given the small 
amount of between group variation, examination of subject level analyses confirms these 
findings, where significant differences were not demonstrated in the subject level model. 
Primary HLM Model: Identity. Group%. and Arg% as Predictors of Negative and 
Positive Responses
Preliminary Fit of HLM Model: Negative Statements. The examination of an 
unspecified HLM model with negative statements presented as an outcome variable 
indicated an ICC (r) of .16, meaning that 16% of variation for negative statements resides 
between groups. Applying the Muthen et al., (2006) formula for sufficient between group 
variation provides a score of 3.23, indicating sufficient variation to use HLM in 
subsequent analyses. Reported deviance for the unspecified model was 97.38.
Inclusion of identity, argument centered statements, and in-group focused 
statements, subject level predictors produced a significant reduction in model deviation 
(97.38 versus 62.24, x2  (1,11) = 35.53,p  = .001). The inclusion of Level 2 predictors of 
inclusion and source also significantly reduced model deviation (62.24 versus 44.30, x2 
(4,8) = 17.93 ,p  = .02). Thus, in each step the addition of both Level 1 and Level 2 
predictors of negative statements increased the overall fit of the model.
Finally, the inclusion of an interaction term of Inclusion X Source examining 
mean differences did significantly reduce variation (44.30 versus 40.03, x2 (1,12) =
84
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3.19,p  =. 05), and the interaction term was significant (p = .02). However, reliability for 
this model was exceedingly low (.001) indicating a very poor fit. As such, the interaction 
term for this model was removed from the analysis, but the reader is cautioned that a 2 - 
way interaction of inclusion and source with regards to negative statements is likely, but 
untenable as a fitted variable in the HLM model.
Primary HLM Model; Identity. Arguments, and Group Focused Statements as 
Predictors of Negative Statements.
In order to examine the potential effects of identity, argument centered statements 
made, and group centered statements made, inclusion, and source as predictors of 
negative statements made, a two level HLM model was employed with identity, 
argument centered statements, and group centered statements as a subject level 
predictors, and inclusion and source as Level 2 predictors. This primary HLM model 
will address whether or not (H4) central processing is inversely related to the amount of 
negative statements made, (H5) out-group manipulations produce more negative 
statements compared to in-group manipulations due to central and peripheral processing, 
(H6 ) low inclusion manipulations produce less negative statements compared to high 
inclusion manipulations due to central and peripheral processing, (H7) identity is 
inversely related to the amount of negative statements made, (H8 ) in-group focused 
statements are inversely related to the amount of negative statements made, and (HI 1) in­
group focused elaborations differentially predict the amount of negative statements made 
due to salience manipulations. Reliability for this model was .52, and approximately 
62% of the between level variation, and 1 0 % of total model variation was explained with
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the addition of these subject level persuasion and identity predictors to the model. The 
outcome of both HLM and OLS predictive analyses are reported in Table 7.
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TABLE 7
HLM and OLS Estimates of Identity, Argument %, Group %, Inclusion, and Source Towards Predicting Negative Statements
Fixed Effect Coefficient
HLM
S.E. /-ratio /7-value Coefficient
OLS
S.E. /-ratio />-value
LEVEL 2 Intercept pO
INTRCPT2, yOO 0.34 0.05 6.12 0.000 0.37 0.03 10.09 0.000
INCLUS, yOl 0.12 0.06 1.92 0.086 0.14 0.04 3.49 0.001
SOURCE, y02 -0.02 0.06 -0.35 0.732 -0.07 0.04 -1.79 0.074
LEVEL 1 Identity pi
INTRCPT2, ylO 0.03 0.03 1.10 0.271 0.03 0.03 1.05 0.292
INCLUS, yll 0.02 0.03 0.79 0.426 0.02 0.03 0.76 0.446
SOURCE, yl2 -0.07 0.03 -2.22 0.028 -0.07 0.03 -2.12 0.035
LEVEL 1 Argument P2
INTRCPT2, y20 -0.33 0.14 -2.39 0.018 -0.33 0.14 -2.29 0.023
INCLUS, y21 0.46 0.17 2.62 0.010 0.46 0.18 2.50 0.013
SOURCE, y22 -0.36 0.17 -2.03 0.043 -0.36 0.18 -1.95 0.052
LEVEL 1 Group Sts P3
INTRCPT2, y30 -0.40 0.14 -2.84 0.005 -0.40 0.14 -2.72 0.007
INCLUS, y31 0.06 0.16 0.38 0.700 0.06 0.16 0.36 0.712
SOURCE, y32 0.17 0.16 1.06 0.290 0.17 0.16 1.01 0.311
Final estimation of variance components:
S.D. s2 3C2 /7 -v a lu e


















































Regarding mean differences, results only indicated a trend (y = .12, p  = .086) for 
inclusion. This finding indicates that high inclusion messages tend to demonstrate 
greater amounts of negative statements, in partial support of our hypotheses regarding 
expected mean differences in negative statements due to salience manipulations (H6 ). 
However, results also demonstrate that out-groups and in-groups do not affect the amount 
of negative statements produced (H5).
Contrary to our hypotheses, identity was not a significant general predictor of 
participants’ negative statements (H7), but results indicate a significant interaction 
between identity and the source of the message towards predicting negative statements (y 
= -.07,/? = .028).This interaction can be seen in Figure 2. As the figure demonstrates, 
participants within groups who perceived the speaker as an in-group member 
demonstrate a strong tendency towards greater amounts of negative statements regarding 
the speaker or argument depending on participant’s greater or lesser degrees of 
identification with the group in question. In stark contrast, individuals within groups who 
were presented a statement by an out-group member tend to present less negative 
statements in association with greater amounts of individual identity.
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With regards to argument centered statements, results indicate a significant 
overall relationship with negative statements made (y = -.33, p  = .018) indicating that as 
less argument centered statements are made (and person oriented statements increase), 
greater amounts of negative statements are presented (H4). This general relationship is 
qualified by two significant interactions of argument centered statements for both 
inclusion (y = .46, p  = .01) and source of the message (y = -.36, p  =.043). These 
interactions can be seen in Figures 3 and 4.
As can be seen in Figure 3, negative statements decrease as arguments increase 
when individuals within groups received a threat regarding only a few specific members 
in their organization. In contrast, those who heard a high inclusive statement threatening 
the entire group showed an essentially constant degree of negativity regardless of the 
degree of statements that focused on the argument made. This finding confirms that 
central and peripheral processing differ as a function of inclusion (H6 ).
With regards to source of the message, Figure 4 shows that when a message was 
presented by an in-group member, negative statements only slightly decreased as 
statements focusing on the arguments of the message increased. In contrast, when the 
message was presented by an out-group member, negative statements sharply decreased 
as participants focused on argument orientated statements. This finding confirms that 
central and peripheral processing differ as a function of source (H5).
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Finally, group focused statements demonstrate a significant predictive relationship with 
negative statements (y = -.40, p  = .005) indicating that as group focused statements 
decrease, (and out-group focused statements increase) negative statements increase (H8 ). 
Neither inclusion or source interacted with group focused statements disconfirming our 
expectation that in-group focused statements would differentially predict negative 
statements as a function of the current studies salience manipulations (HI 1).
Results Section 3; Persistence of Belief and Value; Identity. Inclusion. Source 
Preliminary Analysis of Gronp Differences 
In order to examine potential group differences due to group type, our final series 
of one-way ANOVAs were conducted within each manipulation type for residual bias 
and value. Again Tukey post-hoc tests were employed to determine any significant 
differences within manipulation types. For residual bias only the high inclusion/out­
group condition was significant (F(2,35) = 4.423, p  = .019). Subsequent examination of 
the groups within this condition indicate that the advocacy group in this condition 
retained significantly more bias than either the fraternity or religious group (-4.369 versus 
-3.058 and -0.389,p ’s = < .05). For residual value, only the high inclusion/out-group 
condition approached significance (F(2,57) = 3.008,p  = .057). Subsequent examination 
of the groups within this manipulation indicated that the sorority within this group had 
more positive scores regarding value of their own group compared to the advocacy group 
within this condition (.265 versus -1.400, p  = .048). No other differences were evident or 
significant. Again, due to a lack of significant differences and consistent differences 
across conditions, no dummy codes were created for subsequent analyses.
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General Analyses: Does Bias and Value Persist?
In order to examine our general belief persistence hypotheses that bias persisted 
after participants were informed of the non-veridical nature of the statements, I employed 
two subject level repeated measures t-tests examining initial ratings of the speaker versus 
post-ratings of the speaker. Likewise, initial ratings of perceived group value were tested 
in the same manner against post manipulation ratings of perceived group value. These 
tests examine whether or not (HI 2 ) bias persisted after participants were informed of the 
fictitious nature of the threat, and (HI 3) if reduction in perceived value reverted back to 
initial pre-threat levels.
Results indicate that ratings of the speaker slightly, but significantly, increased 
after being informed that the statement was fictitious (7.37 versus 7.80, /( l,179) = -2.664, 
p  = .008) indicating that bias did not persist, but actually lessened compared to initial 
ratings (HI2). Conversely, results indicate that participants reported significantly less 
belief in the inherent goodness or ‘Value” of their group (10.22 versus 9.92, /(l, 179) =
2.11 l,_p = .04), indicating a reduction of group value that persisted from the manipulation 
ratings (9.95 versus 9.92, t (1,179) = .234 p  = .815), despite information discrediting the 
message presented (H I3). Note that these significant differences represent very small 
changes in ratings, and as such should be viewed cautiously in terms of practical 
implications.
Exploratory Analyses; Identity. Inclusion, and Source Towards Predicting 
Remaining Bias and Value
Preliminary Fit of HLM Model: Residual Bias. Examination of an unspecified 
HLM model indicates an ICC (r) of .08 indicating that 8 % of variation for residual bias
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resides between groups. Applying Muthen et al.’s, (2006) formula for sufficient between 
group variation provides a score of 2.12, indicating sufficient variation to use HLM in 
subsequent analyses. Reported deviance for the unspecified model was 825.26.
Inclusion of identity as a predictor to the model produced a significant reduction 
in model deviation (825.26 versus 820.35, x2 (1,11) = 4.90,p  -  .02), however, inclusion 
of Level 2 predictors did not produce a significant reduction in deviance (820.34 versus 
816. 74, x2 (4,8) = 3.57, p  > .50). Thus, both the predictor only model and the full model 
including both identity and inclusion and source towards predicting residual bias are 
significantly better fits than the unspecified model, but the addition of inclusion and 
source do not significantly contribute more so than just identity as a predictor. Finally, 
the inclusion of an interaction term of Inclusion X Source did not significantly reduce 
variation (816.77 versus 816.73, x2 (1,11) = -04,p >  .50), and was not significant (p = 
.70). As such, the interaction term of inclusion and source was not included in the 
subsequent model.
Primary HLM Model: Identity. Inclusion, and Source as Predictors of Residual Bias
In order to examine the potential effects of identity, inclusion, and source as 
mediators of residual bias a two level HLM model was employed with identity as a 
subject level predictor, and inclusion and source as Level 2 predictors. Reliability for 
this model was .33, and approximately 60% of the between level variation, and 5% of 
total model variation was explained with the addition of these predictors to the model. 
Both HLM and OLS results are reported in Table 8 .
95
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
TABLE 8
HLM and OLS Estimates of Identity, Inclusion, and Source Towards Predicting Residual In-Group Bias
Fixed Effect Coefficient
HLM
S.E. /-ratio /(-value Coefficient
OLS
S.E. /-ratio /7-value
LEVEL 2 Intercept po
INTRCPT2, yOO -1.69 0.38 -4.35 0.002 -1.77 0.30 -5.75 0.000
INCLUS, yOl -0.85 0.46 -1.85 0.096 -0.92 0.35 -2.61 0.010
SOURCE, y02 -0.21 0.46 -0.47 0.648 -0.18 0.35 -0.52 0.601
LEVEL 1 Identity pi
INTRCPT2, ylO -0.54 0.27 -1.96 0.050 -0.54 0.28 -1.93 0.054
INCLUS, yll 0.16 0.30 0.54 0.586 0.16 0.31 0.53 0.592
SOURCE, yl2 0.22 0.30 0.75 0.454 0.22 0.31 0.73 0.461
Final estimation of variance components: ^
On
S.D. X2 /7-value


















































Regarding main effects, results only indicated a trend (y = -.85,p  = .096) for 
residual bias scores to be lower for groups who received a low inclusion message 
compared to those groups who received a high inclusion message.
Identity was a significant inverse predictor of residual bias (y = -.54, p  = .05) 
indicating that as individual levels of identity for participants increased, subsequent 
remaining bias towards the speaker was greater. Identity did not significantly interact 
with inclusion or source for this model.
Preliminary Fit of HLM Model: Residual Values. Finally, in order to determine 
if the lack of change in value was specifically due to one of our salience manipulations, a 
2 Level HLM model was employed to test this possibility. Examination of an 
unspecified HLM model indicates an ICC (r) of .03 indicating that 3% of variation for 
residual beliefs about group-value resides between groups. Applying the Muthen et al., 
(2006) formula for sufficient between group variation provides a score of 1.42 (< 2.00), 
indicating that between group variation is sufficiently small to use ordinary least squares 
techniques to examine potential differences in the variables.
P rim ary  HLM Model: Identity. Inclusion, and Source as Predictors of Residual 
Values
In order to examine the potential effects of identity, inclusion, and source as 
mediators of residual bias an ordinary least squares model was employed examining 
identity, inclusion, and source as subject level predictors or residual group value beliefs. 
Results of the Level 1 analysis are provided in Table 9. Examinations of the results 
indicate that none of the predictors significantly predicted residual value.
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TABLE 9
HLM and OLS Estimates of Identity, Inclusion, and Source Towards Predicting Residual Value
HLM
Fixed Effect Coefficient S.E. /-ratio /j-value Coefficient
OLS
S.E. /-ratio /i-value
LEVEL 2 Intercept PO
INTRCPT2, yOO -0.28 0.24 -1.15 0.251
INCLUS, yOl 0.29 0.28 1.06 0.291
SOURCE, y02 -0.41 0.28 -1.46 0.145
LEVEL 1 Identity pi
INTRCPT2, ylO -0.22 0.22 -0.99 0.322
INCLUS, yll 0.07 0.24 0.30 0.758





















































Overall Findings and Comparison of IRT Conditions
The current study examined the well researched theories of Social Identity 
Theory (Tajfel & Turner, 1979) and Self-Categorization Theory (Turner et al., 1987) 
within a new environmental context. I examined the process and elaboration of threat 
messages within realistic settings where individual participants within organizations were 
exposed to immediate and personally relevant threat messages (e.g., IRT). Our initial 
assumptions were that previous findings would apply to situations where (a) participants 
were recruited from pre-existing student organizations from differing ideologies, (b) a 
threat message was applied in the context of a mediation procedure sponsored by the 
campus, and (c) the nature of the presented message directly criticized the character and 
good behavior of the target group. Our specific findings demonstrate that personally 
relevant threat in realistic situations does not necessarily mimic previous laboratory 
findings (Brewer, 1979; Tajfel et al., 1971), nor do results necessarily correspond to 
experimental scenarios where pre-existing associations such as gender or nationality are 
used as in-groups and out-groups (e.g. Haslam et al., 1992; McGarty et al., 1994; Oakes 
et al., 1991). Although specific findings and their likely causes are explained in 
subsequent sections, these findings within the context of an IRT scenario are likely due to 
one of two new environmental conditions of this study, including pre-existing ideology 
adherence and personally applied threat.
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As discussed previously, one of the recently debated issues within the social 
identity literature (see Turner & Reynolds, 2003) is the generalizability of SIT and SCT 
principals of salient contrast in the context of individual difference measures such as 
social dominance orientation (Pratto et al., 1999). Proponents of the attitude measures 
suggest that higher or lower concentrations of these individuals serve to mediate or 
explain the process of bias creation explained by SCT (see Sidanius & Pratto, 1999). In 
contrast, proponents of SCT have shown that principals of salient contrast will apply 
generally and broadly across groups and organizations, and attitudinal individual traits 
function within the context of salient contrast (Schmitt et al., 2003). The current study 
attempted to explore and validate these SCT findings, by examining the degrees of bias, 
persuasion, and belief and bias persistence inherent in different kinds of ideological 
organizations.
Our results, although not definitive by any means, demonstrate that differing 
ideological groups respond similarly to other groups, at least with regards to threat. 
Across our dependent variables of bias, persuasion, and residual bias, responses were 
generally the same for differing types of organizations. Thus, these findings provide 
initial evidence that in the context of salient contrast between groups (e.g. Haslam et al., 
1996; Haslam et al., 1999), differing ideologies and norms are irrelevant when 
examining bias and evaluation of threat. There are several implications to these findings.
A lack of ideological differences in the context of a situation where radically 
differing types of groups, for instance, a fraternity compared to ideologically dependent 
groups such as advocacy rights or religious groups, provides general support for SCT 
principals. In support of Turner et al. (1987) and numerous subsequent studies (i.e.,
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Haslam et al., 1995; Haslam et al., 1996; Haslam et al., 1999; Oakes et al., 1991), 
intragroup differentiation does seem to be a function of the immediate environment and 
salient contrast, and not pre-existing ideology when dealing with threats from other 
groups. Similarly, a lack of differences in these findings supports general principals of 
social identity theory by supporting a general need to maintain a positive image of the 
group to bolster individual self-esteem.
In contrast, these findings do somewhat rule out a trait explanation of bias, at 
least in the sense that individual types of groups may contain members that hold specific 
norms or beliefs that make them more likely to engage in bias and prejudice. However, 
our findings do not rule out the possibility that individuals within pre-existing 
organizations may believe in social superiority. Rather, it is likely that either beliefs in 
inherent superiority do not manifest within IRT salient contrast or that all of these groups 
contain similar amounts of individuals with these beliefs or similar amounts of these 
beliefs across groups. As such, further research is necessary to fully explain these 
findings with regards to specific bias associated traits. Replication of the current study 
with measures such as social dominance orientation, or perhaps authoritarianism 
(Altemeyer, 1981; 1988) would provide more definitive results along these lines.
More interestingly, these results do imply some other tentative conclusions 
involving ideology. One way to interpret these findings is that regardless of the specific 
ideology, different groups generally respond the same to conflict and threat situations.
As such, these results imply that although the individual need to belong to a group is 
important, the ideological content of group membership is interchangeable with regards 
to threat. Consequently, each individual’s need to belong to a specific group dictates
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his/her reaction to threat that is not necessarily due to specific cherished beliefs that 
promote or inhibit bias. Although current descriptions of identity are defined as 
superordinate to ideology, these findings support a generalizable component of human 
nature towards belonging and protecting what is similar or defining to themselves. This 
need to protect groups that individuals cherish could potentially vary from individual to 
individual, but causes individuals to react the same to others who do not share an in­
group’s belief. Future researchers may wish to examine the degree to which people need 
to define themselves by organizations and characteristics, in relation to the differing 
types of groups that participants select. Should results demonstrate similar reactions 
towards other groups, regardless of ideologically defining characteristics, then findings 
would support the concept that ideology is interchangeable, and essentially, all ideologies 
respond to threat in a similar way. In sum, the current research provides initial evidence 
that regardless of the content of beliefs as either condoned, supported, currently socially 
approved or otherwise, groups generally respond the same to threat and conflict.
With regards to immediate and relevant threat, the current study was the first to 
employ a message that directly targeted the well-being and behavior of a group in 
question. Two overall themes of the research seem evident, due to the implementation of 
IRT. First, the current research strongly suggests that a primary tenant of SCT, namely 
situation specific self-categorization (Turner et al., 1987), does in fact operate within pre­
existing environmentally valid situations. The overall examination of results regarding 
bias and persuasion demonstrate that participants will often re-categorize conceptions of 
in-group and out-group distinctions, not necessarily on established concepts of in-groups 
and out-groups based on membership, but rather the content of the message that
102
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
determines the favorability of another group towards the target group. A simple way to 
put this is that the “squeaky wheel gets the biased response” regardless of whether or not 
the message comes from an in-group or out-group representative. There are, however, 
several caveats with this statement, which are discussed in subsequent sections.
A second theme found is that correlations performed at the subject level, as well 
as subsequent HLM analyses, do not show a hypothesized relationship between identity 
and central and peripheral processing, nor does identity relate to the degree of group 
focused statements made (a premise based on the assumption of salient contrast and high 
and low identifiers; Branscombe et al., 1999). This finding is unexpected, and several 
reasons are possible. One potential cause includes differing forms of measurement from 
how identity and persuasion variables are traditionally defined (these issues are also 
discussed in relevant sections below). It is also the case that the overall lack of this 
relationship was not due to IRT conditions. Comparison of traditional statistics with 
HLM models regarding this relationship suggests that variation due to differing groups is 
not responsible for the lack of the relationship. Likewise the manipulations did not appear 
to confound a potential relationship between identity and these other variables.
One potential explanation for these findings suggests a hierarchical relationship 
between the evaluation of a message, in-group bias and identity. An examination of 
Table 2 demonstrates that all o f our persuasive components that were evaluated (i.e., 
Negative%, Argument%, and Group%) are significantly related to in-group bias in the 
expected direction. In contrast, identity (as it was measured in the study) only 
significantly related to in-group bias. These relationships could suggest that evaluative 
components of a message are mediated by in-group bias with regards to identity. Thus,
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identity predicts trait evaluation of the speaker of a message, but it is the initial opinion 
of the speaker due to identity, that helps determine the cognitive evaluation and outcomes 
of what the speaker presents. This explanation is potentially interesting, as it suggests 
that initial stimulus regarding salient contrast is the first and primary component of 
message evaluation (as has been argued, see McGarty et al., 1994, for an example) that 
dictates persuasive outcomes. However, a formal test of this possibility would involve 
subsequent studies where mediation analyses could be conducted without the confound 
of differing salience manipulations.
Discussion: In-Group Bias and Pre-Existing Groups 
The current examination of in-group bias created in a immediate and relevant 
threat scenario with pre-existing groups demonstrated several interesting findings, most 
of which were contrary to our hypotheses. Generally, our findings show that source did 
not significantly alter the amount of bias generated by groups, although an examination 
of identity demonstrates differences in the slopes of identity to out-groups and in-groups 
regarding bias. However, inclusion did produce significant differences in bias, and in the 
direction expected, where low inclusion threats produced less bias than high inclusion 
threats.
With regards to source manipulations where messages were presented by either 
an organization with similar or differing ideologies, the current experiment did not detect 
significant mean differences. This finding is in direct contrast to early MGP findings 
(Brewer, 1979; Tajfel et al., 1971) and later research involving more complex and non­
monetary exchange designs (Hogg et al., 1995; Turner et al., 1987). However, the 
current findings do not invalidate previous studies that have consistently demonstrated
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differential degrees of bias due to message source. Rather, it is more likely the result of 
the increased threat conditions of IRT compared to previous research. Previous research 
has examined more abstract group conditions of nationality, gender, or school 
membership (Haslam et al., 1995; Oakes et al., 1991). The current study employed a 
direct and immediate threat towards the “good reputation” of various groups. This type of 
scenario not only represents what is more typically received by organizations that take 
stances on religious or political ideologies, but also represents a direct and valid attack on 
individuals’ perceptions of the group to which they belong and the relevant self-esteem 
derived by their membership (Tajfel & Turner, 1979).
As such, one potential explanation of a lack of bias differentiation between 
different sources is due to the fact that another organization complaining or criticizing a 
group will override any similarity derived from similar ideologies. In terms of salient 
contrast and SCT (Tinner et al., 1987), salient contrast is viewed as dependent on the 
situation and also functions under the cognitive mechanisms of comparative and 
normative fit. As stated previously, Haslam and Turner (1992) demonstrated that 
Australians rated Americans poorly when they were the only group to contrast against. 
However, when other groups were present to contrast against, Americans were rated 
much less poorly, due to other groups’ stronger differences from the in-group.
Our lack of mean bias differences due to source manipulation would suggest two 
levels of abstraction and comparative fit. The less abstract (and immediately relevant) 
level of salient contrast would represent a criticizing group versus a group being 
criticized. Salient differentiation in this case is based on strong and salient contrast 
centered on the beliefs that the target group believes in the goodness of its organization,
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whereas the group presenting the message does not. As such, the group in question 
preserves its sense of self-esteem (Tajfel & Turner, 1979) by differentiating itself from 
the representative of the other group. The second and more abstract level represents the 
manipulations that were presented by claiming that the representative was a member of a 
group of very similar or very different ideologies. Simply put, the immediate relevancy 
of threat to the group was more relevant to target organizations than the similarity of the 
group threatening them.
These findings however, do not clearly lend themselves to normative fit at first 
glance. As Oakes et al. (1991) demonstrated, behavior that is considered inconsistent 
with another group inhibits groups’ perceptions of group cohesion. In turn, this lack of fit 
can minimize bias by inhibiting the perception of the group in question as “prototypical”. 
In this particular case a perceived in-group or similar group, would not in theory criticize 
a group that shares similar goals and beliefs. What seems a likely exception to this rule 
is when normative fit is exceptionally poor. Strong criticism seems very unlikely from an 
individual of similar ideology or membership. As a result, a black sheep effect (Hornsey 
& Imani, 2004) occurred to account for such a large discrepancy between expected and 
actual espoused beliefs of the representative speaker.
Essentially, the current findings, although not immediately consistent with 
previous findings regarding the source of a message, can be explained under the current 
conception of self-categorization theory. The likelihood of this interpretation is furthered 
by two current findings. First, the examination of participants’ perception of the source 
of the message were demonstrated by differential degrees of anger and upset reported by 
participants that further support research demonstrating a black sheep effect (Hornsey &
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Imani, 2004). Participants expressed more anger and upset when a message was 
presented by an in-group member. Second, although our results did not demonstrate 
mean differences with regards to source and bias, there was a trend (p = .057) for identity 
to interact with the source of the message. Across target groups, out-groups 
demonstrated a slight downward slope towards greater bias as identity increased. In 
contrast, a steep inverse slope existed with identity and in-group representatives with 
regards to bias. Individual participants who did not have high degrees of identity 
invested within the target group tended to rate an in-group speaker much less negatively 
in contrast to those who did have high degrees of identity. This finding supports our 
expectation that high identifiers perceive threat as threat, regardless of the source of the 
message. As can be seen in Figure 1, high-identifiers rated in-group and out-group 
messages equally negatively. As such, these findings suggest that high identifiers’ 
increased investment within a group results in a backlash towards threat. Both in-group 
sources and out-group sources of criticism in this case represent an attack on an 
organization from which high-identifiers derive meaning and self-esteem. As such, 
either the heathen (e.g., out-group) or heretic (e.g., in-group) deserves scorn.
There are also other interesting implications regarding this interaction of the 
source of the message and amount of bias evoked. Regardless of identity, groups that 
were identified as dissimilar did not vary widely across identity. Although the slope is 
not large, this finding supports Branscome et al. (1999) and Spears et al. (1999) in their 
research showing significant differences in bias for low and high identity members 
towards out-group sources. Interestingly, differences in in-group messages and out­
group messages for low identifiers lend further support to these authors’ conception of
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low identifiers as instrumental in their membership goals. With an in-group source, low 
identifiers would not see any pragmatic gain for themselves by defending the group. 
Furthermore, one distinct possibility is that low-identifiers actually identified more with 
the individual complaining who supposedly comes from another organization of similar 
background. Out-group sources were perceived negatively by low-identifiers, but not 
nearly as negatively as high-identifiers, suggesting that low-identifiers did not see as 
much of an opportunity to further personal goals with an out-group source as compared 
to a similar other group source. In essence, one way to interpret these differences in bias 
for low-identifiers is that in-group sources provided similarity and perhaps advocacy for 
a low-identifier who may not be entirely happy with his or her organization. In contrast, 
low-identifiers did not perceive an opportunity to further group or personal goals when 
threat messages were presented by an out-group member, but due to a weak affiliation 
with the group, were not as upset by the criticism (Doosje al.,. 2002).
In broader terms, bias variation for high and low identifiers in the group is 
generally explained by a black sheep effect (Hornsey & Imani, 2004) where individuals 
who were not deeply invested in a group did not feel as threatened by the active criticism 
of another group of similar ideals. As a result, it seems likely that the perception of the 
representative as an in-group member maintained relevant salience; the presented 
criticism from the in-group member was not as threatening to the individual’s sense of 
self that if not derived from the group in question, may be derived from other groups or 
sources. In a similar vein, low identifiers may have actually sympathized with the 
representative, potentially assuming that the individual presenting the threat themselves
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did not strongly identify with his/her own group, otherwise, he or she would not be 
willing to criticize a similar other group.
Although the source manipulations did not achieve significant main differences 
across groups, our new and experimental manipulation of inclusion of threat did 
demonstrate significant and expected mean differences. Specifically, representatives who 
presented low inclusion threats produced significantly less bias compared to messages 
that were applied to groups as a whole. Reynolds al. (2000) demonstrated that the 
typicality of traits towards a group affects the amount of bias created towards out-groups. 
We in turn, interpreted this finding to suggest that the more a threat is generalized 
towards a group, the more likely greater bias will ensue. These findings present several 
interesting possibilities.
The concept of typicality (e.g., Reynolds al., 2000) was based on mechanisms of 
meta-contrast (Turner al., 1987) as a function of comparative and normative fit (Oakes 
al., 1991). In the case presented by Reynolds et al. (2000), typicality was induced by 
examining participant fit of positive and negative applicable traits that either did or did 
not actually exist in the tested populations. For instance, the adjective of piety would be 
applicable and existent for a religious organization, but not accurately apply to a 
fraternity. Oakes et al. (1991) have previously demonstrated that non-typical behavior 
from an out-group can, in certain situations, inhibit in-group bias, because expectations 
of out-group behavior do not match the expected comparative fit between groups. In 
contrast, the current study altered the message presented to target participants in hopes of 
altering typicality of a threat from a non-internal source, regardless o f its actual 
applicability. Thus, these findings suggest that the perceived typicality of a threat can be
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falsely induced from an external source, regardless of the participant’s perception of the 
veridicality of the statement itself. Given that a broadly applied application of a threat 
produced more bias on average than a threat targeting a few members of the group, the 
inclusion of a persuasive message can serve to exacerbate or lessen salient contrast and 
subsequent bias in a manner that is consistent with principals of comparative and 
normative fit.
However, there is an important caveat regarding this interpretation. First, the 
current research regarding speaker induced typicality (e.g., inclusion) does not imply that 
participant evaluated typicality (e.g., actual applicability of the threat) contributed to 
these results. In other words, results suggest that participants did view a group inclusive 
threat as more salient than a targeted threat, but that does not mean that participants 
themselves did not evaluate the message in terms of its likelihood. Consider the 
possibility that individual participants within a group may not believe that “elitist 
behavior” is in fact typical of the group, however, the speaker presenting a message in an 
immediate and relevant scenario could have potential consequences to the group’s overall 
well being. As such, a high inclusion manipulation induced greater amounts of threat, 
but not necessarily a threat that was believed as typical of the group. Our earlier 
manipulation checks support this interpretation, as participants reported a low inclusion 
threat as more “typical” o f group members than a high inclusion threat, in essence, 
supporting Reynolds et al.’s (2000) findings.
What our inclusion manipulations do suggest is what is defined as “superordinate 
identity categorization” (Reynolds et al., 2000, p 6 6 ). Following the principals of 
abstraction as defined by SCT (Turner et al., 1987), threat created by externally inducing
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typicality overrides internal participant perceptions of typicality as a prominent salient 
mechanism. As such, future research should more closely examine externally versus 
internally applied typicality within both IRT and less threatening conditions to further 
substantiate these findings.
In summation, our examination of bias from an IRT scenario provides several 
general implications for the reaction of pre-existing groups in situations where hostile 
other groups are present. Results suggest that out-group presenters of unpopular 
information will receive more bias towards them, but in-group presenters of unpopular 
information will create overall less bias with members who are less identified with the 
target group. Thus, groups of low-identity members may better receive criticisms from 
other in-group members than high identifiers. Second, criticisms placed towards a few 
specific members are more likely to reduce bias than global criticisms against the whole 
group. These results suggest that the conflict situation that will create the least bias is 
represented by an in-group member presenting a criticism towards a few specific 
members. Similarly, the best reception to a hostile message will occur when the majority 
of members within a target organization are not personally and highly identified with the 
target group in question.
Discussion: Persuasion. Identity, and Cognitive Elaboration 
The examination of persuasion and cognitive elaboration with regards to social 
identity and threat followed several different avenues, many of which provided several 
interesting findings within an IRT scenario. Our general examination of persuasion 
demonstrated that identity as measured by the Luthanen & Crocker (1992) subscale of 
personal identity did not relate to either central or peripheral processing, nor to the degree
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to which individuals focused on in-group or out-group elaborations. Although in earlier 
sections of the discussion we discussed the possibility of a mediation relationship 
between message evaluation, bias, and identity, we discuss further possibilities of this 
relationship in the current section.
With regards to our measurement of identity and the association with central and 
peripheral statements and group focused statements, our findings are somewhat 
surprising, but not entirely unexpected. Results are surprising in the sense that an 
individual’s degree of investment within a particular organization was not related to, and 
therefore did not affect, how participants evaluated a message in terms of argument 
focus. Likewise, central processing was unrelated to identity and greater degrees of 
identity did not contribute to more out-group focused statements. These non-significant 
findings are contrary to previous research and theory. For instance, it would be expected 
that individuals who were considered out-group members would evoke more bias. In 
turn, the nature of the elaborations would invoke peripheral processing representing an 
evaluation of the message based on previously held beliefs about the out-group. Thus, 
greater degrees of identity invested within a group would bias participants towards 
negatively charged statements based on membership, and not necessarily the merits of 
the argument presented. This theory has been previously supported by researchers of 
identity and persuasion and cited as evidence of peripheral processing (e.g., Flemming & 
Petty, 2000; McGarty et al., 1994; Wilder, 1990).
Similarly, our inquiry into the elaboration focus of a message was based on 
principals of identity. In essence, we proposed an intermediate step involving the 
evaluation of a threat message that defined the motivation to focus cognitive attention
112
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
either within the participant’s own group, or towards the group that presented a hostile 
message. Although our findings did generally support the validity of elaboration focus 
(see section below), we expected lower degrees of identity to promote a focus within the 
participant’s group, whereas greater degrees of identity would promote elaborations 
towards the out-group. These expectations were based on principals of prototypicallity 
(Branscombe et al., 1999; Spears et al., 1999), essentially demonstrating that high 
identifiers tend towards greater degrees of bias, and therefore focus on the out-group who 
presented a threat in order to devalue them.
Neither of the above explanations were the case in the current study. There are, 
however, several methodological and theoretical explanations for why identity did not 
predict or relate to central or peripheral statements or group focused statements. One 
simple explanation is that our identity measure simply did not “capture” the other 
necessary components of identity that are associated with cognitive elaboration. Previous 
studies have structured their designs around the creation of in-groups and out-groups that 
were experimentally pre-determined (e.g., Haslam et al., 1995) and have not actively 
employed a measure of identity to determine a subject’s individual importance of group 
membership.
One interesting possibility regarding this finding is that previous researchers 
employing individual measures of identity would discover similar findings if they 
examined both individual and group level scores. This would imply that persuasive 
evaluation of an in-group and out-group message is active on a group level, and not as a 
function of individual identity. Given theories of prototypicallity, where individuals 
within groups tend to conglomerate around typical group behavior (Branscombe et al.,
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1999; Oakes et al., 1991; Turner et al., 1987), this explanation is probable. As such, 
persuasion and identity research might benefit from additional group and subject level 
analyses examining identity at both levels.
Although identity did not relate to central and peripheral processing and group 
focused elaborations, our combined HLM model placing these variables as predictors of 
group-level positive and negative responses provides several interesting findings 
regarding the evaluation of threat in an IRT setting. First, results demonstrated a 
tendency (p < .10) for our inclusion salience manipulation to produce differential degrees 
of negative statements. Specifically, high inclusion statements tended to produce more 
negative statements as opposed to low inclusion statements. This finding is not 
surprising given the general relationship between in-group bias ratings and negative 
statements produced (see Table 2). It seems reasonable to assume that a biased response 
of a speaker would be associated with negative statements regarding what that person had 
to say about participants’ organizations.
With regards to identity as a predictor of negative and positive statements, 
results did not demonstrate an overall relationship between these two variables (unlike in­
group bias), but did demonstrate a significant interaction with source of the message 
towards predicting negative statements. An examination of Figure 4 essentially shows a 
similar outcome of source and identity towards negative statements as with in-group bias. 
Negative statements sharply increased for in-group presenters as individual levels of 
identity increased, whereas negativity tended to slightly degrease as identity increased for 
out-group members. Similar to our interpretation of this effect with in-group bias, these 
results are highly indicative of a black sheep effect (Hornsey & Imani, 2004) where
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participants felt more betrayed by in-group members presenting hostile messages if they 
had greater amounts of invested identity in the group. Conversely, out-group members 
were expected to be negative, and as such negativity slightly decreased for participants 
who reported greater amounts of identity. This decrease in negative statements can 
possibly be attributed to an “expectation of hostility” that would come from out-group 
members. Normative fit will assist comparative fit towards increasing in-group bias (e.g. 
Oakes et al., 1991), but rating the out-group as inferior does not necessarily imply a need 
to respond in a manner that is consistently negative. One possibility is that participants 
reported greater amounts of identity, disdain over the message increased. As such, highly 
identified participants essentially did not lower themselves to the out-groups levels. This 
interpretation is speculative, but might be of interest in future studies.
The examination of individual levels of central and peripheral processing towards 
predicting negative and positive statements provides several additional findings to 
examine. In support of our hypotheses and IRT conditions of threat, our findings 
demonstrate that greater amounts of argument focused statements were associated with 
less negativity. This finding highlights a general trend in early persuasion research 
demonstrating less negative responses to positive arguments when central processing 
occurs (Petty & Cacioppo, 1979; Petty et al., 1983). The general interpretation of these 
findings suggests that the use of central processing in an IRT condition is to alleviate 
perceptions of threat before negatively evaluating the merits of the argument itself.
However, the relationship between the degree of argument focused statements 
and the valence of responses differed for both of our salience manipulations of inclusion 
and source. Specifically, low inclusion statements demonstrated a sharp decline in
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negative statements as argument focused statements increased, whereas high inclusion 
statements were consistently negative regardless of the amount of argument focused 
statements that ensue. This interaction of argument focused statements and negative 
responses across inclusion manipulations further validate our interpretation of mean 
negativity statements for inclusion messages. In essence, low inclusion sources produced 
less negative statements as argument focused elaboration ensued because the message 
was considered less threatening to the group as a whole. Thus, careful consideration of 
the message produced less valid threatening arguments by which all of the members of a 
group should be concerned about personally. In contrast, because the high inclusion 
message threatens the entire group, negativity remains constant regardless of the amount 
of argument focused elaboration that occurs. In essence, although the message was not 
considered likely or typical of the group, participants felt obliged to return threat with 
threat.
In a similar vein, results showed that the source of the message also significantly 
affected the degree to which negative statements and argument focused statements related 
to each other. Results demonstrated a significant interaction where in-group presenters 
of a threat message were rated consistently negatively despite the amount that individual 
target group members focused on the content and validity of the argument. In contrast, 
negativity sharply decreased as argument elaboration ensued for out-group presenters of 
a threat message. This interaction is strongly suggestive of Petty et al.’s (1983) 
credibility effect similar to our explanation of the interaction of identity and source 
towards predicting negative elaborations, and points to a distinct difference in how out­
groups and in-groups are cognitively evaluated. Consider that an out-group source is
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considered less credible and believable by a target organization (McGarty et al., 1994; 
Wilder, 1990). Thus, as the message is elaborated upon, negativity decreases because 
within IRT conditions less validity in the message can be construed as less consequential 
in terms of consequences (e.g., not a valid threat, and therefore, not worthy of disdain).
As a result, argument elaboration increases for messages presented by out-group 
members, and less negative statements ensue because the content of the threat was taken 
less seriously. In contrast, an in-group member would be considered more 
knowledgeable and sympathetic to a group. As such, regardless of the amount of 
cognitive elaboration provided towards the message, negativity remained constant; the 
consequence of betrayal by another organization who holds a similar ideology (e.g., 
black sheep effect, Hornsey & Imani, 2004).
It is important to note that these findings are in stark contrast to early models of 
peripheral and central processing (Cacioppo & Petty, 1979; Petty & Cacioppo, 1979) 
where greater message elaboration would result in greater negativity if  the message was 
not of high caliber (e.g., weak statements and invalid logic, see Petty & Cacioppo, 1979). 
These results also starkly contrast McGarty et al.’s (1994) findings where the out-group 
was generally ignored in terms of message validity and content (but also see Mackie & 
Worth, 1989; Mackie et al., 1990; Mackie et al., 1992). In situations similar to the 
experimental paradigms explained above we would expect our findings to be the opposite 
(i.e., out-groups are consistently negative regardless o f elaboration, whereas in-groups 
show less negativity as central processing increases). However, we believe that the above 
findings are a direct consequence of the IRT condition produced in these experimental 
scenarios. As stated before, none of the previous studies applied an analysis of
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persuasion to messages that had potential and immediate consequences to the well being 
of the group. Messages where final graduation exams may occur in several years (Van 
Knippenberg et al., 1994) or road safety (McGarty et al., 1994) may represent beliefs 
regarding group members about proper behavior, but do not represent immediate 
consequences to the group’s good standing. Thus, in an immediately threatening setting, 
results further support the superordinate role of threat with identity (Reynolds et al., 
2000). Threat overrides salient and relevant contrast because of its immediate 
importance and relevance to group standing (Turner et al., 1987). As such, a member of 
similar ideology presenting a message purporting a change in a particular belief or 
support for an upcoming event would likely be closely evaluated and more positive 
statements presented dependent on the quality of their presentation (i.e., mimicking 
previous researchers’ findings). But, a message presenting inherent threat to a group 
from a representative of a similar organization represents betrayal and internal politics 
within a larger body. Thus, IRT conditions provide evidence that message elaboration, 
bias, and valence of counterarguments do not follow previous research because threat 
generally turns in-group members into potentially more threatening individuals than out­
group members, who are not as knowledgeable about internal workings or are considered 
less respectable because of previous expectations of hostile behavior.
Finally, with regards to group focused statements, a general relationship was 
found between in-group focused elaborations and negative statements. As predicted in 
response to a threat message, greater amounts of in-group focused statements were 
significantly associated with lesser degrees of negative statements. However, contrary to 
our expectation, in-group focused statements did not differentially relate to negative
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statements as a function of our salience manipulations. This finding is somewhat 
surprising. Our expectations of in-group focused statements as a predictor o f negative 
statements were based on concepts of identity and salient contrast. In essence, we 
expected less degrees of salience to promote less contrast and bias between groups. As a 
result, participants within groups would apply the threat message towards the recipients 
of the threat and not the presenter of the threat. Instead, results suggest that group- 
focused statements are not related to identity (at least not directly) and are not influenced 
by differing degrees of salience.
However, our results demonstrate a general principal of persuasion. Individuals 
who focus on the presenter of a threat message are more inclined to present negative 
statements as opposed to participants who evaluate their own group. Thus, a greater 
degree of negativity occurs as out-group focus occurs. Furthermore, in the scope of ELM 
(Petty & Cacioppo, 1986), the positive relationship between these two variables is not 
surprising. Given the lack of effect our salience manipulations had on in-group focused 
statements, one might consider this principal a pre-cursor to central and peripheral 
processing. In essence, out-group focused statements are associated with peripheral 
processing, as would be expected given salient contrast regarding the “different” qualities 
of the out-group (Turner et al., 1987). Conversely, argument focused statements represent 
a greater amount of processing of the message, which is facilitated by applying the merits 
of the message to other group members to test its typicality in context of group 
membership.
These findings regarding in-group focused statements can also be interpreted 
more specifically as a potential inhibitor of normative fit (Oakes et al., 1991) that occurs
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on an individual to individual basis within groups. Participants who are more inclined to 
examine the merits of an argument by applying them to themselves and other members 
are less likely to actively contrast themselves against the out-group. As a consequence, 
negativity regarding the out-group is less. This possibility, however, is very tentative, as 
principals of SCT (Turner et al., 1987) tend to function around group-level manipulations 
of salient contrast. These researchers would not necessarily concur with the above 
interpretation because it would suggest a random degree of normative interference based 
on other factors besides identity (which was unrelated to this measure). A potential 
variable that could validate this interpretation might be need for cognition (NFC) 
Cacioppo, Petty & Morris, 1983), where greater degrees of NFC contribute to in-group 
focused evaluation, and in turn reduce bias. In all, further examination of in-group 
focused statements and bias within laboratory conditions could potentially tease out this 
possibility, or provide direction as to which other potential variables might validate or 
invalidate this possibility.
Regardless of the mechanisms that support a relationship between in-group 
focused elaboration and negative statements, this finding has practical applicability. The 
current research suggests that statements incorporated within a message that focus 
participants to evaluate the merits of a threat or negative message in context of 
themselves and other group members could result in less negativity. As a consequence, 
when presented with a hostile message, participants may evoke less bias if statements are 
designed to promote in-group elaboration. Future research may wish to address this 
possibility by including group focus statements in IRT and laboratory scenarios to 
determine if this is a consistent effect or unique to IRT conditions.
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In summation, our examination of persuasion has provided several interesting 
findings regarding IRT scenarios. In terms of practical applications, presenters of critical 
messages should be aware of black sheep effects (Hornsey & Imani, 2004) in the sense 
that in-groups are not evaluated as well in terms of criticism compared to out-groups, 
who generate less negativity as participants engage in central processing. Likewise, 
presenter criticisms benefit from central processing more so when the message applies 
only to a few members. Finally, the more that a speaker can present a message in such a 
way that focuses participants to elaborate on the message in context of their personal and 
group behavior, the more likely responses will be positive.
Discussion: Belief Perseverance Identity and Salience 
Our examination into the perseverance of belief in terms of bias and belief in the 
participant’s “goodness” of a group demonstrated some interesting findings. Although 
we expected that bias would persist while decreases in value would not, results 
demonstrated that bias was significantly reduced for the entire sample, whereas the 
perception of a group’s value persisted as if  the threat message presented was veridical. 
However, our exploratory examination of residual bias using HLM demonstrates that 
there are exceptions to this finding.
Once residual bias was examined in terms of the differing salience manipulations 
that we provided to participants, results demonstrated that bias was reduced from 
participants’ initial ratings of the message, but initial differences that occurred from 
differing degrees o f inclusion tended (p < .10) to persist. In essence, groups that received 
a low inclusion threat tended to display more residual bias than those groups who 
received a high inclusion message, similar to our examination of initial bias.
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These results are interesting, and to our knowledge, the first of their kind, in that 
they demonstrate that the initial stimulus perceived by participants dictates their 
evaluation of that stimulus when the stimulus in question is negated. In more applicable 
terms, a bias threat induced by a low inclusion message in contrast to a high inclusion 
message continues to differentially persist. Thus, one piece of information provided by 
this research is that the degree to which a message is hostile or threatening is going to 
determine how much bias persists even when the message is proved to be fatuous. This 
is in contrast to what might be expected, in that participants would re-evaluate new 
information regarding the fact that the information was true, and in turn re-evaluate their 
beliefs about the person who presented the message to a generally neutral stance. Instead, 
these differences did not “wash out” given the new information, but instead bias was 
reduced in proportion to the initial bias created.
This “differential persistence of bias” becomes somewhat more complicated by 
a significant relationship between identity and residual bias. Across the groups who 
participated, those individuals who had lower degrees of identity invested in a particular 
group reported less overall residual bias in contrast to those who were highly invested in 
a group. However, identity did not demonstrate differential relationships (e.g., predictive 
slopes) between inclusion or source manipulations for residual bias, indicating a general 
relationship across conditions. Although the relationship between identity and bias 
persistence has not been specifically studied, many other studies within and outside of 
social identity research can corroborate and explain this finding. Anderson (1995a) 
demonstrated that previously held implicit personality theories tend to bias subsequent 
judgments. Similarly, the current research demonstrates that previously held beliefs about
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belonging to and being similar to others in a group will also affect the extent to which an 
individual is willing to “let go” of a message that threatens their beliefs about that group. 
In context of research by Branscombe et al. (1999), low identifiers are willing to re­
evaluate their beliefs (e.g., Anderson & Lindsey, 1998) about the group that threatened 
them as their initial attachment to the group is low, and it does not personally benefit 
them to continue to believe in the negativity attributed to the group. Conversely, high 
identifiers may realize that the threat in question is not valid, but continue to display 
some bias simply because much of their sense of self-esteem and identity is embedded 
within a particular group.
The above results demonstrate that both initial levels of bias created by a stimulus 
as well as the degree of identity invested by participants towards a target group, does 
alter the degree to which bias will persist when attempts are made to negate it. However, 
the examination of changes in their perception of group value using HLM did not return 
any significant findings due to identity or salience manipulations. Thus, unlike bias 
whose findings are qualified by identity and salience manipulations, the overall global 
test of value described earlier seems consistent regardless of identity. That is, the 
significant reduction in participants’ perceptions of their group as a “good group” 
persisted regardless of factual information invalidating the threat.
The persistence of residual value is somewhat perplexing, and contrary to our 
hypotheses that in some cases value ratings might increase due to threat (e.g. Batson, 
1975). However, this finding is consistent to other general studies involving belief 
perseverance (e.g., Anderson, Lepper, & Ross, 1980; Anderson & Sechler, 1986; 
Jennings, Lepper, & Ross, 1981; Ross, Lepper, & Hubbard, 1975), in the sense that
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initial information provided to participants will tend to persist, despite invalidating 
information. What is somewhat disturbing about the current finding is that perceptions of 
value regarding a group that is personally relevant and meaningful to individual 
participants is susceptible to belief persistence. The negative evaluations of a group from 
which participants derive meaning would in theory be less susceptible to negative 
evaluations because of a group’s importance to identity and self-esteem. Moreover, the 
current scenario differs substantially from other belief perseverance scenarios in that the 
target o f the presented information is pre-established and directly relevant to the 
participant. Although other studies have reinforced beliefs by providing praise at 
participants’ accuracy in judging suicide notes (Ross Lepper, & Hubbard, 1975), it stands 
to reason that temporary praise regarding a behavior that was rarely if ever performed by 
participants does not equate to a threat message regarding a group to which an individual 
belongs. Rather, we would expect that the personal relevance of the group in question 
would provide substantially more motivation to examine the new information provided 
by dispelling the threat message (e.g., Anderson & Lindsey, 1998). Thus, a negation in 
the reduction of perceived value of the group would occur. However, it appears that 
belief persistence is “persistent” regardless of the personal relevance or meaning of the 
target of a message, emphasizing the power of this psychological phenomenon.
Given the attempt to examine threat within an IRT setting, several practical and 
tentative applications can be made from this study. With regards to belief perseverance, 
our results suggest that a threat that produces less initial bias is apt to be “forgiven” once 
the information in question is repudiated. Practically speaking, individuals or groups 
accusing other groups of minor infractions will not be held as accountable if proven false
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as compared to grander more inclusive threat producing accusations. Similarly, this 
research suggests that non “core believers” (e.g., low identifiers) are more apt to 
disregard their negative feelings towards others who try to accuse their group of wrong 
doing. The current research demonstrates that when a group in question is accused, those 
who highly identify with it will continue to resent the accuser, even when exonerated 
from wrong doing.
Finally, the continuation in participants’ beliefs that their group was “less good” 
despite discrediting information supports the age old adage of “do not bear false 
witness”. In essence, these results show consequences in how participants view their 
organization when false accusations are presented. However, it is important to state that 
this reduction in value may not persist over time, but rather represents an immediate 
reevaluation of information before provided with additional information regarding the 
falsehood of the information. Future research may want to examine whether participants’ 
views remain more negative of their organization longitudinally, provided this research 
can be conducted without harming participants.
Strengths and Limitations
The above analyses demonstrated both consistent and readily interpretable 
findings in the context of Social Identity Theory and Self-Categorization Theory (Tajfel 
& Turner, 1979; Turner et al., 1987). However, the reader is cautioned towards the 
interpretation of these findings in several ways.
First, although analyses were conducted within manipulations to examine 
potential differences due to group type, group membership was not able to be fully 
crossed within the HLM model. As such, our findings provide initial and suggestive
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evidence that group ideology does not consistently or systematically influence bias, 
persuasion, or belief perseverance within the context of pre-existing groups. However, 
analyses did not control for these differences simply because they were not 
systematically occurring, or frequent enough to allow insertion (and thereby controlled 
analysis demonstrating the individual effect of group ideology) into the HLM model. 
Thus, the current study cannot rule out the possibility that future studies that are able to 
collect a larger, fully crossed sample, may find a small, but significant effect of group 
ideology across college organizations. It is also possible that a systematic examination of 
these variables and group ideology within a laboratory context, without the other 
environmental factors inherent in this study may also demonstrate this finding.
Second, and in a similar vein, our analyses of gender should be interpreted with 
caution. Results in the current manuscript do not suggest that gender of our confederate 
significantly altered our results, and a case could be made that our significant findings 
were over and above what seemed to be a positive evaluation of males towards female 
confederates; however, these findings do not rule out the possibility that gender bias does 
contribute to in-group bias, particularly if the norms inherent in a group revolve around 
beliefs involving gender. This study did not specifically test organizations involved with 
gender equality, nor did any participants come from anti-equality groups regarding 
gender. Future research may demonstrate independent gender-bias outside of traditional 
in-group bias, when the target group in question involves gender specific beliefs.
It is also relevant to note that conclusive tests for actor performance, or 
differences in the dependent variables due to differing colleges or regions, could not be 
satisfactorily conducted. The scarcity of groups willing to participate, in conjunction
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with the need to recruit from multiple campuses and the use of different actors, severely 
limits reliable conclusions from partial analyses. As a result, it is possible that mean 
differences are potentially confounded by regional or actor differences. However, as 
predictor variables were group mean centered, Level 1 predictor variables are immune to 
this possibility. Future research should replicate this study and its findings within one 
particular location, ruling out this unlikely, but potential possibility.
The above advisories having been stated, the overall results of these HLM 
models, although placed on a small sample size, seem consistent, and moderately reliable 
in terms of findings. Results overall do not produce any findings that are un-interpretable 
by current social identity theory. However, this study was specifically designed both as a 
study examining conflict in realistic scenarios, and as a preliminary study from which 
general and applicable findings can be more rigorously examined. As such, results should 
be considered generally applicable. The above having been said, these findings are 
substantial enough and powerful enough given a smaller sample size to suggest that the 
majority of these results should replicate in future studies. Other studies could replicate 
these findings by letting group membership randomly vary across participants in a 
laboratory setting. However, laboratory studies would only be relevant if a method could 
be devised to present threatening, and possibly positive messages that are generic enough 
to be meaningful by a large variety of campus organizations.
Future Research
Additional studies in traditional and non-traditional venues would provide 
additional evidence to support these environmentally relevant findings. One of the 
weaknesses of the current study involves the use of group level analyses. Although the
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use of HLM allows for subject level analyses and intra-class correlations between 
subjects within groups, individual level studies should be conducted. To that extent 
future research should use the world-wide-web as a potential medium for follow up 
studies. A wide variety of participants could be presented one of several pre-prepared 
positive and negative evaluations of groups, organizations, and ideologies, based on self- 
identifying information provided in a preliminary survey. With some forethought, a large 
sample of participants could be assessed on positive and negative assessments of groups 
or organizations from which they personally derive identity.
In addition, the above design would allow for a greater amount of differing 
ideological groups, which could be precisely analyzed in subject level OLS designs, 
further testing our preliminary findings regarding differences in bias due to group 
ideology. With a large enough sample size across many different ideologies, small 
differences in bias or persuasion could be detected within individual ideologies.
Likewise, the further addition of inclusion and source manipulations could be examined 
within positive and negative contexts providing more insight regarding threat persuasion 
and conflict.
Subsequent studies using a similar internet format could make use of our basic 
findings regarding in-group focused elaborations. The addition of a manipulation 
variable either encouraging or discouraging in-group elaboration would represent a 
second important test of salience and bias reduction due to in-group focused elaboration. 
Differences in bias and elaboration due to participants’ focus on the validity of the threat 
for their own group compared to applying their cognitive efforts towards repudiating the
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out-group, would support a practical application of group-focused elaborations towards 
reducing conflict in difficult situations.
Should subsequent studies replicate a general lack of differences in bias across 
differing ideologies, the implications would warrant a study that investigates a potentially 
subject level variation in the need to belong and identify oneself to ideologies regardless 
of the particular ideology to which one adheres. The essence of this research would 
attempt to find commonalities between highly identified participants across groups in the 
hopes of finding similar needs and desires to clearly identify “me and not me” via the use 
of organization or ideology membership. Successful findings along these lines would 
support a conclusion that with regards to negative reactions, membership is important, 
but ideology is ultimately irrelevant.
Conclusion
In an attempt to examine SCT and SIT within realistic and threat settings, the 
current research provides initial evidence that bias, persuasion, and belief perseverance 
function within the context o f previously established social identity and self­
categorization theory premises (Tajfel et al., 1971; Turner et al., 1987). What is 
important about the current research is that although results are explainable in terms of 
the above theories, IRT conditions do not directly correspond to other studies that either 
did not explore more specific pre-existing ideologies or did not induce direct threat. We 
believe that the current research provides several additional and exciting avenues of 
research to follow regarding identity and threat in realistic conditions and has generally 
demonstrated immediately practical and generalizable findings for individuals who 
regularly deal with conflict in real-word settings. Similarly, the current study has
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demonstrated two new potential variables that contribute to bias and salience, namely, 
speaker induced inclusion and group-focused elaborations, that future studies may find 
valuable towards predicting, and perhaps mediating bias.
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REFERENCE NOTES
1 The use of the term “persuasion” in this particular research context should be 
interpreted judiciously. Persuasion researchers (e.g. Petty & Cacioppo, 1979, McGarty et 
al., 1994) have previously examined attitude change in the context of positive or negative 
reactions to a particular message, positive or negative responses, or individual evaluative 
processes (e.g. central or peripheral processing). However, these kinds of evaluations do 
not assess long term attitude change. Rather, in the current context, persuasion represents 
an initial evaluative positive or negative response to a particular message.
2 Belief Perseverance can also be operationally defined as belief persistence. For 
the sake of the current research belief perseverance is defined as participant’s tendency to 
maintain a lessened belief about the goodness of their group, despite clear instructions 
that indicate that the threat message is fictitious.
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APPENDIX A
INTERPRETING HLM
HLM functions very much like multiple regression, with the exception that the 
data is modeled on subject and group level responses. In the current study, HLM is used 
to conduct both an ANOVA style analysis of mean differences, as well as more 
traditional regression-like prediction analyses. At Level 1 predictors are placed towards 
predicting the dependent variable. Nominal group-level manipulations are placed at Level 
2 .
HLM reports a gamma score, the standard error of the mean, a t coefficient, and 
probability. The principal effect coefficient is represented by y. Gamma represents the 
un-standardized effect of the variable on the dependent variable. As with multiple 
regression, the gamma score is similar to B in a multiple regression. Gamma represents 
the amount of change in independent variable in context of one unit change in the 
dependent variable. In any HLM output the gamma divided by the standard error of the 
mean will reproduce the t-score, which is used to determine significant variation. As a 
result, if gamma is large and the S.E. is small, a significant result is likely.
Regarding the current use of HLM, please refer to Table 3, which represents an 
analysis of in-group bias. At Level 1 individual’s identity scores are placed as a predictor 
of in-group bias. At Level 2 Inclusion (high, low) and Source (in-group, out-group) are 
coded as dummy variables.
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Level 2 results are represented as INTERCPT, INCLUSION, and SOURCE. These 
variables are denoted as yOO - y02 . Because these terms are dummy coded, Level 2 
analyses represent a test of mean differences due to the manipulation on the dependent 
variable. These scores can be interpreted exactly the same as conducting an ANOVA 
using multiple regression. As such, a significant intercept represents a model that 
predicts significantly better than the mean of the dependent variable. Likewise, a 
significant gamma for either inclusion or source represents a significant mean difference 
in the D.V. due to the manipulation.
Level 1 HLM outputs are also presented with INERCPT, INCLUSION and SOURCE 
terms, but are interpreted differently because the predictor is a continuous variable. For 
Level 1 predictors a significant intercept represents an overall across group significant 
relationship between the predictor (in this example, identity) and the dependent variable 
(in this case, in-group bias). The INCLUSION and SOURCE variables at Level 1 
represent a test of an interaction of identity with either of the Level 2 variables of 
inclusion and source. A significant gamma for either of these variables can be interpreted 
the exact same way as a nominal/ordinal interaction term placed in multiple regression. In 
other words, a significant interaction of a Level 1 continuous variable and a Level 2 
nominal variable represents a significantly different association (e.g. slope) between 
identity and bias within each condition. As an example, a significant gamma for the Level 
1 INCLUSION term would indicate that the slope of identity and bias in the low 
inclusion conditions are significantly different from the high inclusion conditions. In 
these cases, Figures are presented to examine the practical interpretation of the 
interaction.
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APPENDIX B
PRELIMINARY STATEMENTS AND CONSENT
Hello, you are probably wondering why I am here. My name is Brian Laythe and I am a 
doctoral student of psychology. I am conducting an experiment on a technique for group 
communication sponsored by the psychology department with cooperation from xxx. 
Another student organization has requested to speak with you and has agreed to let us try 
our new technique with you all. This is (xxxx), their representative. Although I am sure 
other representatives from student groups have spoken with you before, this 
communication technique is experimental, and in order to participate you have to fill out 
a consent form. Please read and sign these forms. After you complete a consent form, 
we will give you more information about our speaker and this process. After we have 
given you this information we will give you a second opportunity to not participate in this 
communication process.
(AFTER COLLECTION OF CONSENT FORMS)
Thank you for deciding to participate. Our new communication technique is a new way 
to promote effective and uninhibited communication of thoughts and feelings between 
groups when complaints have been made against a student organization. This is why I 
am here.
MANIPULATION A. (IDENTIFICATION AS OUT-GROUP)
Members o f another student organization that have very different eoals and ideals 
than (enter group name here) have made complaints about this group.
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MANIPULATIONB. (IDENTIFICATIONAS IN-GROUP)
Members o f another student organization that have very similar soals and ideals like 
(enter group name here) have made complaints about this group.
(xxxx), as the representative of this group will present their feelings and concerns to 
you in a brief statement within the context of a experimental procedure. Your 
anonymous individual responses will be typed and sent back to the organization that 
will speak to you shortly.
Our process focuses on both groups having the freedom to express their opinions 
without worry of specific affiliation or peer-pressure. This is why I have not 
identified (xxxx) group affiliation. If you recognize the representative speaker’s 
group affiliation, please keep it to yourself until the end of the experiment.
We provide you questionnaires to give you the opportunity to voice their own opinions 
and feelings and state what you really feel and think without worrying about your peer’s 
opinions.
HOPEFULLY, THIS WILL CREATE A PRESSURE FREE ENVIRONMENT FOR 
EVERYONE TO EXPRESS THEMSELVES.
PROCEDURE:
There is a specific structure to this program because we are interested in the effectiveness 
of this technique as a mediation tool for situations involving complaints. In a moment, 
we will provide a packet that contains 3 parts (Sections A, B, and C). Each section asks 
you to answer various scale items, but also provides you an opportunity to write your 
comments and opinions down. HOWEVER, PLEASE DO NOT TURN TO ANY 
SECTION UNTIL WE ASK YOU TO.
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You will notice that there are no identifying marks on these packets other than an I.D. 
number and section identification. This is to ensure your individual privacy.
Before the representative speaks, we will ask you to fill out the first section (Labeled 
section A). This packet allows us to assess your relationship with this student 
organization.
After you all complete section A, the representative will speak to you. After the 
representative has finished speaking please use the second packet (Labeled section B). 
Section B is designed so that you answer several important questions about the 
representative but also allows you to voice any concerns that you may have.
As part o f our experimental procedure, we insist that you do not ask questions during this 
part o f the program, but answer the questions and write your comments within the 
section B packet.
When everyone’s Section B packet is finished, we will make some brief comments and 
then ask you to complete a very brief third part of the packet (labeled Section C).
After completion of all three sections, we will reveal (xxxx) affiliation and have a 
structured discussion about group concerns.
Now that you have full information about this procedure, we would like to repeat 
that this procedure is voluntary. If anyone has now chosen not to participate we 
would ask them to please leave the room.
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2. Manipulation Statements
STATEMENT AGAINST THE ENTIRE ORGANIZATION
Thank you for letting me speak as a representative of concerned people in our group.
IF PRESENTED AS AN IN-GROUP MEMBER:
I would like to say first of all that I am a (xxxx) like the rest of you.
However,
IF PRESENTED AS AN OUT-GROUP MEMBER:
I’ll be to the point about this
We have some problems with (your groups) behavior at XXX. Several of us have 
watched you give some pretty serious attitude to people you talk to, like the {insert 
group) is some “special group of people”. Many people in our group have suggested 
(your) actions to mean that you think you are better than everybody else, and I tend to 
agree with them.
On several occasions, members of my group told me that {You all) have acted like the 
{insert group) has the right to shove your group down everyone else’s throats. People in 
my group have told me that they can’t get a word in because {everyone in the xxxx) are 
too busy acting offended and telling everybody how things should be. Then {all o f you) 
go off about how you don’t do this sort of thing or how that’s the wrong way to do this or 
that.
We think that you need to be aware of your own actions with other people on campus. 
It wouldn’t hurt {all o f you) to listen a little more and respect others around you. Other 
people different from you might deserve respect too. Just because people may not be 
from (the xxxx) does not mean that they do not have important or helpful things to say.
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STATEMENT AGAINST A FEW INDIVIDUALS WITHIN THE ORGANIZATION 
Thank you for letting me speak as a representative of concerned people in our group.
IF PRESENTED AS AN IN-GROUP MEMBER:
I would like to say first of all that I am a (xxxx) like the rest of you.
However,
IF PRESENTED AS AN OUT-GROUP MEMBER:
I’ll be to the point about this
We have some problems with (a few of your members) behavior at XXX. Several of 
us have watched (members of your group) give some pretty serious attitude to people you 
talk to, like the (insert group) is some “special group of people”. Many people in our 
group have suggested (these members) actions to mean that you think you are better than 
everybody else, and I tend to agree with them.
On several occasions, members of my group told me that {these members) have acted 
like the (insert group) has the right to shove your group down everyone else’s throats. 
People in my group have told me that they can’t get a word in because {some members o f 
xxxx) are too busy acting offended and telling everybody how things should he. Then 
{these people) go off about how you don’t do this sort of thing or how that’s the wrong 
way to do this or that.
We think that you need to be aware of your own actions with other people on campus. 
It wouldn’t hurt {these members o f xxxx) to listen a little more and respect others around 
you. Other people different from you might deserve respect too. Just because people 
may not be from (the xxxx) does not mean that they do not have important or helpful 
things to say.
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3. Pseudo Debriefing Statement
Thank you for listening and participating in our attempts to further communication 
between social groups. However, I wish to tell you now that you have been deceived. 
Our speaker in fact does not represent another social group. The statements that you just 
heard accusing your group were fictitious. We are not aware of any group that has 
concerns of issues with your behavior. The statements that you just heard have no basis 
in reality. In fact we made them up. Our representative and ourselves have no quarrels 
with your behavior, and do not endorse any of the views that you previously heard. 
Although we admit that we have deceived you, we now ask that you indulge us for five 
more minutes. We have a very small final assessment sheet that we would like you to fill 
out. We ask you to answer these questions within the context of the information that we 
have just provided you. Part of the reason we ask you to do this, is to ensure that you 
have heard us correctly and understand that these statements were not based in fact. Let 
me make this clear: the group the speaker represented is fictitious. As soon as you are 
finished with this quick assessment we will provide an extended explanation as to why 
we have deceived you, our motivation behind it, and how this experience can be valuable 
for you as a group and personally.
Again, we thank you for your indulgence.
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4. Final Debriefing Statement
I would like to thank you again for participating and explain why we have deceived you. 
My name IS Brian Laythe, but I am not examining a new communication technique. You 
have just completed an experiment that examines group identity and conflict. I am a 
psychology graduate student and these are my research assistants (provide research 
assistant names here). We apologize for deceiving you, but I am examining how social 
groups respond to threatening information, and the only way we could get an honest 
response is by creating a story to justify giving you these surveys. We realize that you 
may be upset and we want to let you voice any concerns that you have. We do not want 
anyone to leave here feeling badly.
We have performed this experiment because we are trying to understand specific 
factors that contribute to conflict. Several events across university campuses make an 
empirical examination of conflict worthwhile, even if we deceived you temporarily. For 
instance, campus riots have occurred at Indiana University Bloomington, and the 
University of New Hampshire. In addition, frequent and often intense debates occur 
between student organizations across university campuses. Your participation in this 
experiment may help to alleviate conflicts across campus by providing us a better 
understanding of the nature of group conflict. We hope that you feel that our deception 
was justified.
There are a few things that I want you to know up-front:
1. You were not specifically picked for this experiment for any reason
other than the fact that your group represents a body of individuals who 
share similar goals and ideals.
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2. I am currently in the process of performing this experiment with many
other groups some of which are similar to yours and some of which are 
not.
In essence, I promise that I am not picking on you, and that other groups be they 
religious, political, or in the Greek system, have been or will be participating in this 
experiment.
Your group participated in one of four conditions that we believe either exacerbate or 
minimize feelings of bias or conflict between groups (state condition here). One of our 
goals is to compare these conflict conditions across various groups with differing 
ideologies to see what differences exist, and attempt to determine if specific ideologies in 
themselves promote or hinder conflict.
The surveys that you completed essentially addressed three large areas that may help 
us understand conflict between groups. The first of these addressed any feelings of 
conflict or bias from being confronted with a negative message. Our other two areas 
concerned:
1. How you processed the message by examining your written responses.
2. How your feelings towards the speaker and feelings about your group changed 
when we informed you that the statement was fictitious.
The culmination of this data that you have helped us collect could prove to be 
invaluable in minimizing conflict between groups. For instance, we may discover that 
certain conflict situations always produce bias, and an inability to process a valid 
complaint message. We may also discover that if someone has been falsely accused that 
further steps have to be taken for people to believe in their innocence. More importantly,
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these studies can tell us what ways complaints between groups should not be handled, 
information that we feel the IUS community will find valuable. For instance, if 
something is important to your group, wouldn’t you like to know the best way of 
approaching another group to ensure that you get what you need? If the group that you 
are approaching has different goals than yours, then the information we collected today 
would be useful to you.
Finally, because we feel that this research is important and useful to many groups, we 
would like to ask a favor of you. Although we have deceived you, it is of crucial 
importance that other groups not know about what we are doing in order for us to 
continue this research. Thus, we ask you to help us one last time by serving as 
confederates of our experiment. Please do not discuss this experiment with other groups 
or people that you know.
That is all we have to say, unless there are any other concerns. PLEASE FEEL FREE 
TO ASK ME ANY QUESTIONS THAT YOU WISH OR DISCUSS ANY NEGATIVE 
FEELINGS THAT YOU STILL HAVE. We again want to emphasize that we do not 
want anyone to leave here upset or disturbed. As you leave please take a debriefing sheet 
that has my number xxx-xxx-xxxx and my advisor, Dr. xxxxxxx number, xxx-xxx-xxxx. 
If you have any additional concerns or upset from this experiment please do not hesitate 
to call us. Finally, if you have any questions or concerns about your rights as a 
participant, please contact xxx-xxxx, at the Office of Academic Affairs, xxx-xxx-xxxx.
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Thank you for participating in our discussion. The
following questionnaire will ask you 
questions about your affiliation with 
this organization. Because some of these 
questions are personal, we would like to 
assure you that your confidentiality is 
guaranteed. Please be as honest as 
possible. Below you are some questions 
that ask about general information on 
your background group affiliation.




2. What is your age?_____






4. What is your marital status?
a. Married _
b. Living with romantic partner _
c. Single, never married _
d. Single, divorced. _

















e. I attend all meetings _____
8. Do you belong to any other campus 
organizations?
YES NO
9. If so, please tell us how many other 
campus organizations that you belong to.
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Please rate the following statements below with the following rating scale.
1 = strongly disagree 2 = disagree 3 = disagree somewhat 4 = neutral 5 = agree
somewhat 
6 = agree 7 = strongly agree
1 . 1 am a worthy member of this group. ______
2 .1 often feel I’m a useless member of this group. ______
3 .1 feel good about this group. ______
4. In general, others think that the group I belong to is unworthy. ______
5. In general, belonging to this group is an important part of my self-image. ______
6 . 1 feel I don’t have much to offer this group. ______
7. In general I’m glad to be a member of this group. ______
8 . Most people consider my group, on the average, to be more ineffective than other 
social groups. ______
9. This group is an important reflection of who I am. ______
1 0 . 1 am a cooperative participant of this group.________________________ ______
11. Overall, I often feel that the group of which I am a member is not worthwhile.
12. In general, others respect the group I belong to._____________________ ______
13. This group is unimportant to my sense of what kind of person I am. ______
14.1 often regret that I belong to this group.___________________________ ______
15. Overall, my group is considered good by others.____________________ ______
16. Overall, my membership in this group has very little to do with how I feel about 
myself. ______
155
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
Please take a moment to look at the person who is about to speak to you. Please rate 
your assessment of him or her on the following items below.
- 6  -5 
inferior
- 6  -5 
uncreative
- 6  -5 
unhelpful
- 6  -5 
unfriendly




- 6  -5 
close-minded
unjust
A  -3 -2
A  -3 -2
-4 -3 -2
A  -3 -2
A  -3 -2
A  -3 -2
-4 -3 -2
- 6  -5 -4 -3 -2










2 3 4 5
2 3 4 5
2 3 4 5












2 3 4 5 6
cooperative








How much would you say that your own personal beliefs and actions are typical 
of your group’s beliefs and actions?
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13
not at all typical completely typical
Would you say that other members of this group behave in such a way that 
promotes the “positive image” of your group?
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13
not at all completely
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Please rate your own group on the following i
_ 6  -5 -4 -3 -2
inferior
_ 6  -5 -4 -3 -2
uncreative
- 6  -5 
unhelpful
- 6  -5 
unfriendly
- 6  -5 
uncooperative
- 6  -5 
ignorant








- 6  -5 -4 -3 -2









2 3 4 5 6
superior
2 3 4 5 6
creative
2 3 4 5








2 3 4 5 6
cooperative








When I think about it, I am similar to the average member of this group
1 2 3 4 5 6  7 8  9 10 11 12 13
not at all very much
When I think about it, I am similar to the person who is the representative speaker 
for this presentation
1 2 3 4 5 6  7 8  9 10 11 12 13
not at all very much
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COMMUNICATION ASSESSMENT AND GROUP RESPONSE
PARTB
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1. How important are the issues presented by the speaker to you?
1 2 3 4 5 6  7 8  9 10 11 12 13
not at all extremely
important important
2. To what extent do you agree with the content of this message?
1 2 3 4 5 6  7 8  9 10 11 12 13
do not at all completely
agree agree
3. To what extent do you agree that action should be taken about the issues just 
presented?
1 2 3 4 5 6  7 8  9 10 11 12 13
no a lot o f
action taken action taken
4. To what extent does this person’s statement emotionally upset you?
1 2 3 4 5 6  7 8  9 10 11 12 13
not at all extremely
emotionally upset emotionally upset
5. To what extent does this person’s statement anger you?
1 2 3 4 5 6  7 8  9 10 11 12 13
not at all extremely
angry angry
6. To what extent do you feel that the speaker’s statements accurately reflect your 
group’s behavior?
1 2 3 4 5 6  7 8  9 10 11 12 13
not at all completely
7. To what extent do you think that the speaker’s statements apply to everyone in 
your group?
1 2 3 4 5 6  7 8  9 10 11 12 13
applies to applies to
very few  in the group everyone in group
8. When I think about it, I am similar to the average member of this group
1 2 3 4 5 6  7 8  9 10 11 12 13
not a t a ll very much
9. How much would you say that your own personal beliefs and actions are typical 
of your group’s beliefs and actions?
1 2 3 4 5 6  7 8  9 10 11 12 13
not at all typical completely typical
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10. Would you say that other members of this group behave in such a way that 
promotes the “positive image” of your group?
1 2 3 4 5 6  7 8  9 10 11 12 13
not at all completely
11. To what extent did you like the messages just presented?
1 2 3 4 5 6  7 8  9 10 11 12 13
didn’t like really liked
12. To what extent do you feel that the arguments just presented were convincing?
1 2 3 4 5 6  7 8  9 10 11 12 13
not at all extremely
convincing convincing
13. Would you judge the reasons given for the speaker’s argument to be
1 2 3 4 5 6  7 8  9 10 11 12 13
poor quality very good quality
and uncompelling and compelling
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Please rate the speaker that you just heard on the items below.
_ 6  -5 -4 -3 -2
inferior
- 6  -5 -4 -3 -2
uncreative
- 6  -5 
unhelpful
- 6  -5 
unfriendly





. 6  -5 -4 -3 -2
ignorant
- 6  -5 
close-minded
-4 -3 -2
- 6  -5 -4 -3 -2
unjust







2 3 4 5
2 3 4 5
2 3 4 5












2 3 4 5 6
cooperative
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Please list any and all comments or thoughts that you had while listening to the speakers 
statements. Please feel free to include any comments about anything related to what the 
speaker said in the speech, the speaker and the speaker’s personality, the topic of the 
speech, the context in which the speaker spoke, or anything else you might have been 
thinking about during message presentation, including totally unrelated things.
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POST ASSESSMENT OF COMMUNICATION 
PART C
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1. How important are the issues presented by the speaker to you?
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13
not at all extremely
important important
2. To what extent do you agree with the content of this message?
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13
do not at all completely
agree agree
3. To what extent do you agree that action should be taken about the issues just 
presented?
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13
no a lot o f
action taken action taken
4. To what extent does this person’s statement emotionally upset you?
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13
not at all extremely
emotionally upset emotionally upset
5. To what extent does this person’s statement anger you?
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13
not at all extremely
angry angry
6. To what extent do you feel that the speaker’s statements accurately reflect your 
group’s behavior?
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13
not at all completely
7. To what extent do you think that the speaker’s statements apply to everyone in 
your group?
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13
applies to applies to
very few in the group everyone in group
8. When I think about it, I am similar to the average member of this group
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13
not at all very much
9. How much would you say that your own personal beliefs and actions are typical 
of your group’s beliefs and actions?
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13
not at all typical completely typical
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10. Would you say that other members of this group behave in such a way that 
promotes the “positive image” of your group?
1 2 3 4 5 6  7 8  9 10 11 12 13
not at all completely
11. To what extent did you like the messages just presented?
1 2 3 4 5 6  7 8  9 10 11 12 13
didn’t like really liked
12. To what extent do you feel that the arguments just presented were convincing?
1 2 3 4 5 6  7 8  9 10 11 12 13
not at all extremely
convincing convincing
13. Would you judge the reasons given for the speaker’s argument to be
1 2 3 4 5 6  7 8  9 10 11 12 13
poor quality very good quality
and uncompelling and compelling
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Please rate the speaker that you just heard on the items below.
- 6  -5 -4 -3 -2 -1 0
inferior
_ 6  -5 -4 -3 -2
uncreative
- 6  -5 
unhelpful




- 6  -5 
ignorant








_ 6  -5 -4 -3 -2








2 3 4 5 6
superior













2 3 4 5 6
cooperative








Finally, before participating, were you made aware of the nature of this program by 
another person? Yes No
Before we told you that the representative presented fictitious information, did you 
believe that his/her statement came from another student organization?
Yes No
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I n d i a n a  u n i v e r s i t y  s o u t h e a s t
I N S T I T U T I O N A L .  R E V I E W  B O A R D  M E M O
To: Brian R. Laythe
1737 Elm Street East 
New Albany, IN 47150
From: Marcia T. Segal, chair
Subject IRB #03.45
Date: June 29,2004 ^ '
CC: Diane E. Wille, Psychology
“Communication and Resolution between Student Groups with Disagreements” IRB #03.45
Thank you for your memo of June 25,2004 responding to the mono of June 21,2004 from the 
IRB indicating the changes required for approval of your protocol. Please note that on the 
subject line and also in die line containing the tide of the project, dm protocol is referenced as 
IRB #03. 44. This is an error. The correct number for this protocol is IRB 03.45; the error was 
mine. Please refer to IRB #03.45 in all future correspondence. In order to avoid confusion, I am 
sending you a corrected copy of that earlier memo.
The information regarding the data-gathering instruments is now complete and you have made 
the changes in the contact information in various {daces so that they are consistent
The file is now complete and the protocol has been approved. Please remember that all forms 
and scripts used in the research must be identical to those approved as of this date.
Please notify the IRB prior to making any changes and to file a progress report no later than one 
calendar year from the date of this approval.
Thank you for your cooperation with the review process.
034S.nb.wpd
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Michael R. Cunningham, PhD 
Communication Dept
RE: 052.05 - Communication Between Student Organizations 
Dear Doctor Cunningham:
The revised consent form for the above study, dated 1/27/05, has been received by the Human Subjects Protection 
Program office and contains the changes requested in the Institutional Review Board (IRB) email letter of 1/26/05. The 
following items have been approved:
• Protocol dated 1/27/05
• Revised informed consent dated 1/27/05
Your study now has final IRB approval. Please note that the IRB operates in accordance with ICH guidelines and is 
further mandated by the Office of Human Research Protection (OHRP) and the Food and Drug Administration (FDA).
The study has approval through 1/31/06, when the approval expires. You should complete and return the 
Progress Report/Continuation Request Form EIGHT weeks prior to 1/31/06, in order to ensure that no 
lapse in approval occurs.
Federal regulatory agencies have indicated that studies must be re-approved by the IRB before the expiration date. 
Otherwise, the approval will expire and no further subjects can be entered until the study is re-approved by the 
Committee (study suspension). It is the investigator's responsibility to obtain re-approval, including any changes needed 
in the consent form, prior to the expiration date.
Office of Research Approval
Please note that; as indicated on the Review Certification Form, if this study meets the definition of a sponsored activity, 
a Proposal Clearance Form must be completed and filed with the Office of Grants Management (OGM) at the University 
(502-852-6512). If a study has an industry sponsor, a Multi-institutional Research Application will need to be filed with 
the Office of Industry Contracts (OIQ. In that case, separate approvals by the OGM, OIC and the IRB will be required 
prior to activation of the proposed study.
The attached documents have been approved by the University of Louisville IRB. Please print these out for your use. No 
further letters will be generated from our office.




UofL Human Subjects Protection Program




Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
After review, IRB protocol #054-120-UL submitted by Brian Laythe from 
the University of Louisville has been approved by the University of 
Southern Indiana's IRB.
I can follow up with an "official notice” early next week. Please review 
the comments below.
Thank you.
M. Heather Dragoo 
Sponsored Research Specialist 
Sponsored Research Office, WA 104K 
University of Southern Indiana 
8600 University Blvd.





Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
UWRSnYcfKXMLLE
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HUMAN SUBJECTS PROTECTION 
PROGRAM OFFICE
University of Louisville 
M edCerter One, Suite 200 







Michael Cunningham, PhD 
Communications - University of Louisville 
Louisville KY 40292
RE: Study #062.05 - Communication Between Student Organizations
Dear Doctor Cunningham:
The continuation request for the above study was reviewed by the Chair of the Institutional Review 
Board (IRB) through the expedited review procedure, according to 45 CFR 46.110(F)(8-9) and 21 
CFR 56.110, since the continuing review of research previously approved by the convened IRB as 
follows: where (0 the research is permanently closed to the enrollment of new subjects, all subjects 
have completed all research-related interventions; and the research remains active only for long-term 
follow-up of subjects. The study now has continued committee approval from 2/1/2006 through 
1/31/2007.
The following items were reviewed and approved:
• Progress Report, dated 1/5/06
• Protocol and Synopsis, not dated
The committee will be advised of this action at their next full board meeting.
Please submit a Progress Report/Continuation Request Form eight weeks prior to 1/31/07, in 
order to ensure that no lapse in approval occurs.
Best wishes for the continued success of your study. Please send all inquires and electronic 
revised/requested Items to  our office email address at hsDoofc4Mouisville.edu.
Sincerely,
f
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